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ABSTRACT
This paper presents economic models of child development that capture the essence of recent
findings from the empirical literature on skill formation. The goal of this essay is to provide a
theoretical framework for interpreting the evidence from a vast empirical literature, for guiding the
next generation of empirical studies, and for formulating policy. Central to our analysis is the
concept that childhood has more than one stage. We formalize the concepts of self-productivity and
complementarity of human capital investments and use them to explain the evidence on skill
formation. Together, they explain why skill begets skill through a multiplier process. Skill formation
is a life cycle process. It starts in the womb and goes on throughout life. Families play a role in this
process that is far more important than the role of schools. There are multiple skills and multiple
abilities that are important for adult success. Abilities are both inherited and created, and the
traditional debate about nature versus nurture is scientifically obsolete. Human capital investment
exhibits both self-productivity and complementarity. Skill attainment at one stage of the life cycle
raises skill attainment at later stages of the life cycle (self-productivity). Early investment facilitates
the productivity of later investment (complementarity). Early investments are not productive if they
are not followed up by later investments (another aspect of complementarity). This complementarity
explains why there is no equity-efficiency trade-off. for early investment. The returns to investing
early in the life cycle are high. Remediation of inadequate early investments is difficult and very
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The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings; and of that capital the
most precious part is the result of the care and in￿uence of the mother.
￿Alfred Marshall (1890, paragraph VI.IV.11)
The study of human skill formation is no longer handicapped by the taboo that once made it imper-
missible to discuss diﬀerences among people. It is well documented that individuals are very diverse in a
large variety of abilities, that these abilities account for a substantial amount of the interpersonal variation
in socioeconomic outcomes, and that this diversity is already apparent at an early age. The family plays
a powerful role in shaping these abilities, contributing both genetic endowments and pre- and post-natal
environments, which interact to determine the abilities, behavior and talents of children. Some families do
this task poorly, with detrimental consequences for their children. From a variety of intervention studies,
we know that it is possible to partially compensate for exposure to adverse environments if high-quality
interventions are made suﬃciently early in children￿s lives. The remediation eﬀorts that appear to be most
eﬀective are those that supplement family resources for young children from disadvantaged environments.
Since the family is the fundamental source of inequality in American society, programs that target children
from disadvantaged families can have substantial economic and social returns.
This chapter presents formal models of skill formation that distill the essence of recent empirical ￿ndings
from the literature on child development. The goal is to provide a theoretical framework for interpreting
the evidence from a large empirical literature, for guiding the next generation of empirical studies, and for
formulating policy.
Recent empirical research has substantially improved our understanding of how skills and abilities are
1formed over the life cycle. The early human capital literature (Becker, 1964) viewed human capital as
a rival explanation for human ability in explaining earnings. It emphasized that acquired human capital
could explain many features of earnings distributions and earnings dynamics that models of innate and
invariant cognitive ability could not. This point of view still underlies many recent economic models of
family in￿uence (e.g., Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986; Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri, 2002). Related
work (Ben Porath, Knudsen; Griliches, 1977) emphasized that invariant innate ability was an input into
the production of human capital, although its eﬀect on human capital accumulation was ambiguous. More
innate ability could lead to less schooling if all schooling does is to teach what an able person could learn
without formal instruction. On the other hand, more innate ability might make learning easier and promote
schooling. The signaling literature (Spence, 1973, and Stiglitz, 1975) focused on the latter interpretation in
developing models of education where higher levels of schooling signal higher innate ability. In its extreme
form, this literature suggested that there was no learning content in schooling.
The entire literature assumed that ability is an innate, scalar, age-invariant measure of cognitive skill.
This early point of view still prevails in most quarters of economics. Except for work by Marxist economists
(see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1976, and Edwards, 1976), noncognitive traits like motivation, persistence,
time preference, and self control were neglected in empirical research and treated as ￿soft skills,￿ peripheral
to educational and labor market outcomes.
In contrast to the wisdom of Marshall (1890), as encapsulated in the quotation that begins this chapter,
the recent economic literature on family in￿uence on child outcomes focuses on family income constraints
and heritability as the principal sources of parental in￿uence on child development. Becker and Tomes
(1979, 1986) initiated a large literature that emphasized the importance of credit constraints and family
income on the schooling and earnings of children. Important developments of this work by Benabou
(2000, 2002), Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Hanushek, Leung,
and Yilmaz (2004), and Seshadri and Yuki (2004), emphasize the role of credit constraints and altruism
2in forming the skills of children. In this work, ability is treated as determined by genetic factors. The
life cycle of the child at home is collapsed into a single period so that there is no distinction between
early and late investments in children. Becker and Tomes (1986) show that there is no trade-oﬀ between
equity and eﬃciency in making government transfers directed toward credit-constrained families because
the return to human capital investment in children from such families is high due to the presence of credit
constraints. We show that their insight holds true for early period investments in a multi-period model
of child investment, but not for investments in later periods. We also generalize their discussion of credit
constraints to a multiperiod setting following work by Caucutt and Lochner (2004), Cunha (2004), and
Cunha and Heckman (2004).
Recent research, summarized in Heckman (2000) and Carneiro and Heckman (2003), presents a richer
picture of schooling, life cycle skill formation and earnings determination. It recognizes the importance of
both cognitive and noncognitive abilities in explaining schooling and socioeconomic success. These abilities
are themselves produced by the family and by personal actions. The role of the mother is especially
important, as anticipated in the quote by Marshall that begins this chapter. Both genes and environments
are involved in producing these abilities. Environments aﬀect genetic expression mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Turkheimer et al., 2003). This interaction has important theoretical and empirical implications for skill
policies. It suggests an important role for environment-enriching policies in fostering human skills.
In the light of a substantial body of recent research, the traditional sharp distinction between acquired
skills and genetically determined cognitive ability maintained in the human capital literature is no longer
tenable. Abilities are multiple in nature. They are both cognitive and noncognitive. Measured cognitive
ability is susceptible to environmental in￿uences, including in utero experiences. So is measured noncogni-
tive ability. There are genetic components to both.1 We have come to understand that achievement tests
used to monitor performance in school and to determine acceptance into the military are not the same as
1See Robinson, Grozinger and Whit￿eld (2005) for a summary of recent research on primates and other animals.
3IQ tests. Achievement test scores are determined by IQ, noncognitive inputs and by environmental factors.
Even IQ can be aﬀected by environmental interventions at least up to age 10 or so.2 It is hard to change
IQ after this age. In the popular literature, achievement tests and IQ tests are often confused.3 Achieve-
ment test scores are aﬀected by IQ, schooling inputs, and noncognitive skills, and are malleable over a
much greater range of ages than is IQ. Noncognitive abilities such as motivation, self-discipline, and time
preference￿associated with the development of the prefrontal cortex￿are also aﬀected by environmental
in￿uences. They are more malleable at later ages than IQ. Achievement test outcomes can be in￿uenced
until very late ages and are aﬀected by both cognitive and noncognitive skills. Noncognitive abilities and
cognitive abilities aﬀect schooling attainment and performance, and a wide array of behaviors (Heckman,
Stixrud and Urzua, 2004). Abilities have an acquired character although they diﬀer in their malleability
at diﬀerent ages.
We characterize the human skill formation process in the following fashion. Skills and abilities are used
interchangeably throughout this chapter because both are aﬀected by environments, investment and genes.
Agents possess a vector of abilities at each age. These abilities￿or skills￿are multiple in nature and range
from pure cognitive abilities (e.g., IQ) to noncognitive abilities (patience, self control, temperament, time
preference). Achievement test scores are aﬀected by cognitive, noncognitive and environmental inputs.
These abilities are used with diﬀerent weights in diﬀerent tasks in the labor market and in social life more
generally.
The human skill or ability formation process is governed by a multistage technology. Each stage
corresponds to a period in the life cycle of a child. Inputs or investments at each stage produce outputs at
that stage. Unlike the Ben Porath model (1967), in our models qualitatively diﬀerent inputs can be used
2Until age 4 or 5, measures of IQ do not predict adult IQ very well. Using parental IQ actually yields a better prediction of
the child￿s score at age 15 than any test given before age 5. After age 10, however, IQ becomes stable within the constraints
of psychometric measurement error. See Jensen (1980) for a discussion.
3See, e.g., Herrnstein and Murray (1994).
4at diﬀerent stages and the technologies may be diﬀerent at diﬀerent stages.4 The outputs at each stage
are the levels of each skill achieved at that stage. Some stages of the technology may be more productive
in producing some skills than other stages, and some inputs may be more productive at some stages than
at other stages. Those stages that are more productive in producing certain skills are called ￿sensitive
periods￿ for those skills. If one stage alone is eﬀective in producing a skill (or ability) it is called a ￿critical
period￿ for that skill.
An important feature of this technology is that the skills produced at one stage augment the skills
attained at later stages. This is termed self-productivity. It embodies the idea that skills acquired in one
period persist into future periods. It also embodies the idea that skills are self-reinforcing. For example,
self-control and emotional security may reinforce intellectual curiosity and promote more vigorous learning
of cognitive skills. A second key feature of skill formation is complementarity. Skills produced at one stage
raise the productivity of investment at subsequent stages. In a multistage technology, complementarity
also implies that levels of skill investments at diﬀerent ages bolster each other. They are synergistic.
Complementarity also implies that early investment has to be followed up by later investment in order for
the early investment to be productive. Together, complementarity and self-productivity produce multiplier
eﬀects which explain how skills beget skills and abilities beget abilities.
Complementarity, self-productivity of human capital and multiplier eﬀects imply an equity-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ for late child investments but not for early investments. These features of the technology of skill
formation have consequences for the design and evaluation of public policies toward families. In particu-
lar, the returns to late childhood investment and remediation for young adolescents from disadvantaged
backgrounds are low, while the returns to early investment in children from disadvantaged environments
are high.
4Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) generalize and estimate the Ben Porath model by allowing the technology producing
schooling human capital to be diﬀerent from the technology producing post-school investment. Su (2004) and Cardak and
Givon (2004) develop multistage models of secondary and postsecondary schooling choices focusing on determinants of
progression through school. Their emphasis is on later stages of the life cycle, not the early years.
5Our analysis demonstrates the quantitative insigni￿cance of credit constraints in the college-going
years in explaining child college enrollment. Controlling for cognitive ability, under current meritocratic
policies in American society, family income during the child￿s college-going years plays only a minor role in
determining child college participation, although much public policy is predicated on precisely the opposite
point of view. Abilities (and skills) are formed over time, and the early periods in a child￿s life cycle are
crucial for development. Augmenting family income only in the time period when a child goes to college
will not make up for suboptimal investment in the 18 years before. Permanent family income plays an
important role in explaining educational choices, insofar as it is a proxy for the high level of investment
in abilities and skills that wealthier families provide, but it is not synonymous with family income in the
adolescent years, nor with tuition and fees.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003) present evidence for the United States that only a small fraction (at
most 8%) of the families of American adolescents are credit constrained in making their college decisions.
The quantitatively important constraints facing disadvantaged children are the ones determining their
early environments￿parental background, and the like. The empirically important market failure in the
life cycle of child skill formation is the inability of children to buy their parents or the lifetime resources
that parents provide, and not the inability of families to secure loans for a child￿s education when the child
is an adolescent. Our analysis has major implications for the way policies should be designed in order to
help low income and disadvantaged populations. Evidence from disadvantaged populations demonstrates
that enriched early interventions can raise measured ability and other skills.
Ours is an unusual survey. The standard approach to survey writing in empirical economics is to
compile lists of facts and ￿treatment eﬀects￿ from various empirical studies. Instead, in this chapter,
we develop a comprehensive model of the skill formation process that is grounded in the best available
empirical evidence. We distill general theoretical principles that can guide skill formation policy. We
present economic models that focus on basic principles. Any study of skill formation policy grounded in
6economic and scienti￿c fundamentals improves on a purely empirical approach to policy evaluation that
relies on evaluations of the programs and policies in place or those previously experienced. Although
economic policy analysis should be grounded in data, it is important to recognize that those policies
that can be evaluated empirically are only a small subset of the policies that might be tried.5 If we base
speculation about economic policies on economic fundamentals, rather than solely on estimated ￿treatment
eﬀects￿ that are only weakly related to those fundamentals, we are in a better position to think beyond
what has been tried to propose more innovative answers to skill formation questions. We investigate the
study of skill formation policy by placing it in the context of economic models of life cycle learning and
skill accumulation rather than focusing exclusively on which policies have ￿worked￿ in the past. The
current literature on childhood skill formation abounds in facts and ￿gures, but lacks a clear interpretive
framework that is faithful to the evidence. If a picture (graph) is worth a thousand words, then a model
is worth a thousand pictures (graphs). Our models summarize the existing evidence succinctly and point
the way to future developments.
Any model that is faithful to the evidence summarized in this paper must recognize that (a) parental
in￿uences are key factors governing child development; (b) early child investments must be distinguished
from late child investments and that an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ exists for late investments, but not for
early investments; (c) abilities are created, not solely inherited, and are multiple in variety; and (d) the
traditional ability-skills dichotomy is obsolete. These insights change the way we interpret evidence and
design policy. Point (a) is emphasized in many papers. Point (b) is ignored by models that consider
only one period of childhood investment. Points (c) and (d) have received scant attention in the formal
literature on child investment.
The central concept in this paper is the production function for skills. Since both skills and abilities
can be acquired, we do not distinguish between these two concepts. Both skills and abilities are aﬀected
5See Heckman and Vytlacil (2005a, b) for comprehensive discussions of econometric policy evaluation.
7by genes, environments and personal actions.6 We use a skill production technology to interpret the
evidence on the life cycle evolution of skills and abilities, developing the technology and its implications
more formally in part III.
Here, we provide an intuitive summary of the main theoretical ideas that organize the evidence presented
in this paper. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are two stages in the life cycle of the child prior
to attaining adulthood. Adulthood is a third and ￿nal stage. Denote investment in a child during period
t as It, and the skill produced from that investment as St for t =1 ,2.B o t hIt and St may be vectors (e.g.,
cognitive and noncognitive skills), and they may be of diﬀerent dimensions. The St are diﬀerent levels of
the same skills or abilities at diﬀerent stages. Thus St could contain a variety of abilities and skills, ranging
from pure IQ to noncognitive skills like motivation. It could also include cognitive skills as measured in
achievement tests that are aﬀected by IQ, motivation and self-control. It is a vector of investments at
stage t. These may be stage-speci￿c investments (e.g., phonics lessons) or general investments that are not
stage-speci￿c. Some stages may be uniquely suited to the formation of some skills. These are the critical
or sensitive periods previously discussed. Some levels of some skills may be very small at some stages.
Let S0 be the vector of initial skills of the child, say at birth. These skill levels may be in￿uenced by
in utero experiences and genetics.7 We de￿ne the technology of skill formation at stage t in a recursive
fashion:
St = ft(It,S t−1), (1)
where ft(•) is increasing in (It,S t−1) and is concave in It. For simplicity, we assume diﬀerentiability, except
in special cases. Each stage of the life cycle may have a diﬀerent production technology using diﬀerent
6One possible distinction between abilities and skills is that the latter are acquired by personal actions while the former
are acquired by external in￿uences. This distinction is not sharp since personal actions may aﬀect the operation of the
environment on the individuals, and personal actions (self help programs) may alter abilities.
7As emphasized in the studies in Keating and Hertzmann (1999) these endowments are in￿uenced by parental genes and
environment.
8inputs.8
Diﬀerent adult tasks j =1 ,...,J require skills that can be combined in diﬀerent ways to produce
task-speci￿co u t p u ta tp e r i o dt in adult life, Tj,t. The tasks correspond to the outputs in the J diﬀerent
occupations (e.g., lawyer, ditch digger, full time mother, athlete):
Tj,t = Tj,t (St) for j =1 ,2,...,J. (2)
In some tasks, components of St can substitute for each other. In other tasks, those same components may
be strongly complementary. For example, to be a good mother requires many skills. To be a good ditch
digger requires fewer skills.
The Appendix presents a more general discussion of our speci￿cation of the technology of skill formation
and compares it to the conventional Ben Porath (1967) model which is a very special case of our framework.
Throughout much of this paper, we focus on technology (1), and for simplicity we assume that there is one
task in the economy. However, task function (2) reminds us that remediation for early disadvantage may
take two forms: (a) through later investments or (b) through subsidy and technical change in the tasks
that disadvantaged children can perform in adulthood.9





∂S1 > 0.10 More generally, some components of S1 may be productive for S2 while
others may not or may even have a negative eﬀect. This formulation is suﬃciently general to allow cross
eﬀects of knowledge of one skill (or ability) on another skill (or ability).11 The concept of universal direct
8This technology and its properties are developed more formally in the Appendix.
9For example, remediation through technological change might involve automatic change machines for cashiers who are
innumerate.
10A better terminology would be ￿recursive productivity,￿ where the output from one stage is the input in the next stage
because S1 and S2 can be vectors.
11In capital theory, the ￿crusonia vine￿ of Knight (1944) is a pure version of a self productive process. His vine grows at
a ￿xed rate of g per year, independently of any inputs once the seed is sown. In our notation, for a scalar St this would be
St =( 1+g)St−1, so that St =( 1+g)tS0 and
∂ft
∂It ≡ 0 for t>0. Our notation is more general because we allow for multiple
inputs that may interact synergistically.





For the vector case, this says that higher levels of the stocks of all skills increase the productivity of period
2 investment. More generally,
∂2f2(I2,S1)
∂I2∂S0
1 ≥ 0, since some inputs may not be complementary with stocks of
past skills or abilities. Even more generally, some skills may have a negative eﬀect on the productivity of
some investments.12
In addition to the notions of direct complementarity and self-productivity in skill production, there is
the notion of complementarity or substitution of period t skills in each task, as determined by the task
function (2). The story of the tortoise and the hare tells us that it is sometimes possible to compensate by
eﬀo r tw h a to n el a c k si np u r ea t h l e t i cs k i l l .I nt h eg e n e r a lc a s ew i t hJ diﬀerent task functions corresponding
to diﬀerent adult jobs or occupations, tasks will have diﬀerent degrees of substitution among the skills,
and some components of skills are irrelevant for certain tasks, so it is possible in some tasks to compensate
for skill de￿cits while for other tasks it may not be. A failure to acquire one skill can be oﬀset by choosing
to do tasks that do not require it or else by compensating for investments in other skills.
The structure of complementarity or substitutability in investments over time as governed by equation
(1) is crucial in determining whether or not there is an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ for late investments.13
12In capital theory, Hayek￿s (1941) stages of production of capital entail investments at each stage that are stage-speci￿c.
His theory encompasses both self-productivity and direct complementarity.
13Complementarity has multiple de￿nitions in economics and these de￿nitions are not equivalent (Samuelson, 1974). The
two polar cases, perfect substitutes and perfect complements, have been a part of the economist￿s toolkit at least since Fisher
(1892). A production function for output, g(x,y),d e ￿ned in terms of inputs (x,y) is said to exhibit perfect substitution
among the inputs if the output g(x,y) is
g(x,y)=g(ax +( 1− a)y), 0 <a<1.
Thus x and y substitute perfectly in the sense that one unit of y produces exactly the same output as
(1−a)
a units of x for
all levels of x and y. If x is an early input and y is a late input, technically one can always remediate for a low x input by a
compensation in terms of y. If a =1 , this is not possible. The closer a is to 1, the greater the required remediation in y.A s
we note in this chapter, it may not be economically feasible or eﬃcient to remediate.
10To see this, consider two children, A and B,w i t hSA
0 = SB
0 but who diﬀer, for whatever reason, in their
level of period 1 investment, I1. We assume that there is only one investment good. Suppose that A comes
from a deprived environment whereas B does not so ﬂ IA
1 < ﬂ IB
1 .14 Given period 1 investments, what is the
appropriate investment allocation for period 2? If there is one skill, and the goal is to maximize the sum
Perfect complementarity characterizes g(x,y) if
g(x,y)=g(min(x,y)).
This is an ￿O ring￿ technology where output is limited by the weakest link (the lowest level of input). Thus if x is an early
input, a low level of x cannot be remediated by any investment in y. Another implication of this technology is that if x is
big, a low level of y undoes the early investment.
As e c o n dd e ￿nition of complementarity and substitution, sometimes called direct substitution or complementarity, for a












What is confusing is that the two de￿nitions do not always agree. Suppose that g(x,y)=ax +( 1− a)y. Then (x,y) are
perfect substitutes under the ￿rst de￿nition, but they are independent inputs under the second de￿nition. Note further that
if (x,y) are perfect complements under the ￿rst de￿nition, g is not everywhere diﬀerentiable. However, if g is strictly concave
and diﬀerentiable, (x,y) are perfect substitutes under either de￿nition. To make matters worse if g(x,y) is homogeneous of
degree one and
∂2g(x,y)




so that inputs are direct complements.
The CES technology for two inputs,
g(x,y)=[ axσ +( 1− a)yσ]
1
σ ,
nests the two polar cases subsumed in the ￿rst de￿nition (σ =1perfect substitutes; σ = −∞ for perfect complements). The




so that (x,y) are direct complements for all values of the substitution/complementarity parameter σ. In the general case
with more than 2 inputs, direct complementarity is not imposed as a consequence of assumptions about substitution or
complementarity in the CES case. In the example, we use the two polar cases because they are intuitive.
14Plausibly SA
0 <S B
0 , but we abstract from this.











1 = ﬂ I
B
1 .15
This is the ￿social planner￿s￿ problem.
Assume that the resources available for investment are M.16 We assume that the social planner is
free to impose taxes and lump sum transfers in the population. For large enough M (i.e., assuming that
investment is feasible), this problem yields the interior solution
∂f2(IA











The marginal return to second period investment should be equated across persons.17
Consider the role of complementarity and substitutability by ￿rst studying the polar case in which
inputs are perfect substitutes in the intuitive (Fisher, 1892) sense of the term. If I2 and S1 are perfect
substitutes, the second period technology can be written as S2 = f2(γS1 +( 1− γ)I2) for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
The parameter γ determines the relative productivity of investment in the diﬀerent periods. For interior






































15This criterion is the same as maximizing human capital if adult skill is the same as adult human capital.
16This may include social and private resources.
17Low M may imply zero investment for one or both persons unless Inada conditions (which guarantee in￿nite marginal
product at zero levels of input) are imposed on the production function.
12so there is full compensation for adverse early environments.
If S1 and I2 are strong complements in the intuitive sense of that term, we obtain a very diﬀerent result.
Consider the polar opposite case of perfect complementarity (i.e., the so called ￿Leontief case￿) with
S2 = f2 (min{S1,I 2}).
It takes a unit of S1 and a unit of I2 together to produce S2. In the Leontief case, eﬃciency dictates
that lower ￿rst period investments in A relative to B be followed by lower second period investments in
A relative to B (ﬂ IA
1 < ﬂ IB
1 implies IA
2 <I B
2 ). Eﬃciency in this case dictates a policy that perpetuates the
initial inequality of inputs due to disadvantaged environments. Attempts to remediate early de￿cits are
not possible due to the structure of the technology of skill formation. There is an eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ
for period 2 investments, but not for period 1 investments. With this production technology, the skill level
attained in period 2 is restricted by the skill level attained earlier. Period 1 is a bottleneck period. Eﬃcient
period 2 investment can be no larger than period 1 investment. Period 1 is critical in the sense that if no
investment is made that period, there is no harvest in the second period and compensation is not possible.
This example is a bit arti￿cial because we have postulated only a single skill. More generally, there may
be some skills (abilities) that are essential for making investment in the second period productive.
Complementarity has a dual face. Investments in the young are essential and cannot easily be substi-
tuted for by later investments. At the same time, later investments are needed to make the early investments
pay oﬀ.O ne ﬃciency grounds, the Leontief example shows that early disadvantages will be perpetuated
and compensatory investments at later ages may be ineﬃcient if complementarity is suﬃciently strong.
On the other hand, a technology with perfect substitutes and equal productivity of investments at all
ages implies that the timing of investment is irrelevant for producing a given level of human capital. Indeed,
with discounting and common unit investment costs across periods, common productivity in both periods
13(i.e., γ = 1
2), and S1 = I1, later investments are preferred to early investments because it is cheaper to defer
costs. Second period compensation for adverse environments will be eﬃcient. Delaying all investments to
the second period is optimal. However, if γ is close to 1 it may be very costly to remediate de￿cient ￿rst
period investments. When γ =1 , it is impossible.
We develop some implications of complementarity and age-speci￿c productivity in this paper for the
general vector case in the Appendix. We organize the evidence we present around the concepts of self-
productivity and complementarity. We introduce the notion of a skill multiplier in section 7. The available
empirical evidence on human skill formation is consistent with both self-productivity and complementarity.
These features of the technology of human skill formation explain why early interventions targeted towards
disadvantaged young children are more eﬀective than interventions given to older disadvantaged children,
and why later investments yield higher returns for the more able.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Part II presents the evidence. Part III presents simple formal
models that summarize the evidence by using economic theory, applying the concepts of complementarity,
self-productivity, and the derived investment multiplier. Part IV concludes the paper.
14Part II
A Summary of the Empirical Evidence on
Life Cycle Skill Formation
1 Human Capital Accumulation
Skill formation is a dynamic process. The skills and abilities acquired in one stage of the life cycle aﬀect
the productivity of learning in the next stage. Human capital, as we de￿ne it in this chapter, consists
of diﬀerent types of skills and abilities. It is now well established that cognitive ability is an important
determinant of schooling and labor market outcomes (see Heckman, 1995). At the same time, noncognitive
abilities, although harder to measure, play an important role as well (see the evidence in Heckman, Urzua
and Stixrud, 2004). As emphasized in recent studies of child development (e.g., Shonkoﬀ and Phillips,
2000), diﬀerent abilities are formed and shaped at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle. Empirical evidence
from human and animal species tells us that when the opportunities for formation of these abilities are
missed, remediation can be costly, and full remediation prohibitively costly (Cameron, 2004; Knudsen,
2004; Cameron, Heckman and Knudsen, 2005). These ￿ndings highlight the need for economists to take a
comprehensive view of skill formation over the life cycle.
The dynamic feature of human capital accumulation has implications for how investments in human
skills should be distributed over the life cycle. Figure 1A summarizes the major ￿nding of an entire
literature. It plots the rate of return to human capital at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle for a person of
given abilities. The horizontal axis represents age, which is a surrogate for the agent￿s stage in the life
cycle of skill formation. The vertical axis represents the rate of return to investment assuming the same
15amount of investment is made at each age. This is an out-of-equilibrium productivity curve which we
derive more formally in part III. Ceteris paribus, the rate of return to a dollar of investment made while
a person is young is higher than the rate of return to the same dollar invested at a later age. Optimal
investment pro￿les equate the marginal rate of return to investment with the opportunity cost of funds in
all periods and for all persons, assuming that these investments are feasible. For an externally speci￿ed
constant opportunity cost of funds r (represented by the horizontal line with intercept r in Figure 1A), an
optimal investment strategy is to invest relatively less when a person is old and more at younger ages (see
Figure 1B). For persons with higher ￿innate￿ ability (higher S0 in the production technology of Part I),
the curve lies farther out to the right.
Cognitive ability is only one aspect of S0. It is necessary for success in life, but for many aspects of
performance in social life, it is not suﬃcient. Noncognitive abilities also matter for success both in the
labor market and in schooling. Even when early childhood interventions do not boost IQ, they improve
noncognitive skills, with substantial eﬀects on schooling, labor market outcomes, and behavioral outcomes
such as teenage pregnancy and participation in criminal activities. They raise achievement test scores,
which can be in￿uenced by schooling (and other inputs), even when they do not boost IQ. In light of this
evidence, the neglect of noncognitive ability in evaluating human capital interventions, and in formalizing
the skill formation process, is unwarranted. We summarize the evidence on the importance of noncognitive
skills in section 3. For now, it will suﬃce to say that both types of skills or abilities are aﬀected by families
and schools, but they diﬀer in their malleability over the life cycle. Diﬀerences in levels of cognitive and
noncognitive skills by family income and family background emerge early and persist. If anything, schooling
widens these early diﬀerences, but the main gaps in these skills that are found in adulthood emerge before
schooling begins.
162E a r l y T e s t S c o r e D i ﬀerentials
Important diﬀerences in the ability of children across family types appear at early ages and persist. Figure
2A plots average percentile ranks18 on the Peabody Individual Achievement Test in Math (PIAT Math)
by age for diﬀerent quartiles of family income. This test is a measure of age-appropriate math knowledge.
There are large gaps by the time children enter school. The gaps in ranks across income quartiles remain
relatively stable as children develop. Such gaps also appear in other test scores, although for some test
scores they widen slightly.19 Just as income gradients in schooling participation rates are evident, racial
diﬀerences in early test scores also emerge. Figure 2B presents evidence on the emergence of racial gaps
in ranks on the PIAT Math Test.
Ability aﬀects schooling participation and aﬀe c t sw a g e sa sw ed o c u m e n tb e l o w .I ti ss h a p e de a r l yi n
life. The available evidence indicates that IQ is relatively more malleable early in the life cycle than in
later years (see Shonkoﬀ and Phillips, 2000 and Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Having access to more and
higher-quality resources that contribute to improving cognitive ability early in life aﬀects skill acquisition
later in life. IQ is not the same as what is measured by achievement tests. Achievement tests are aﬀected
by schooling and other environmental in￿uences into adolescence even if IQ is not (see Hansen, Heckman
and Mullen, 2004; Heckman, Larenas and Urzua, 2004).
Figures 3A and 3B present the gaps in PIAT Math from the previous two ￿gures after controlling
for some main features of the child￿s family background. The gaps across racial and income groups
are signi￿cantly reduced when we control for maternal education and cognitive ability,20 and for family
structure. Measured long-term family factors play a powerful role in a correlational sense. The gaps at age
18In constructing the graph in Figure 2A, we computed each individual￿s position in the distribution of test scores at each
age. Then we divided individuals into diﬀerent quartiles of permanent family income and computed the average percentile
rank at each age. Because the scale of test scores is arbitrary, an analysis of test scores can only determine how the factors
being studied shift people in the overall distribution of ability.
19For evidence on other tests, see Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov, 2005
20Cognitive ability is measured using the Armed Forces Quali￿cations Test, corrected for the eﬀect of schooling using the
methodology of Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2004).
1712 do not disappear entirely, however, when we compare the highest and lowest income quartiles or whites
with blacks. The evidence from early intervention programs with randomized assignment that we discuss
in section 6 shows that these correlational results have a causal basis. When disadvantaged children are
given enriched early environments, the gaps in academic achievement test scores between advantaged and
disadvantaged children can be partially remedied.
The emergence of early test score gradients is not limited to cognitive measures. At early ages, dif-
ferences in children￿s behavior across income and racial groups are also evident, as Figures 4A and 4B
illustrate. These ￿gures present diﬀerences in ranks on an index of Anti-Social Behavior across diﬀerent
income and racial groups. The Anti-Social Behavior index is based on exhibiting age-speci￿cb e h a v i o r s
like cheating and telling lies, bullying and cruelty to others, not feeling sorry for misbehaving, breaking
things deliberately, disobedience at school, and trouble getting along with teachers. High values of the
index correspond to a higher prevalence of behavioral problems. As we discuss further in section 3, under-
standing the gaps in these behavioral skills across diﬀerent income and racial groups and how to eliminate
them is important for understanding the determinants of economic success. Figures 5A and 5B present
Anti-Social Behavior index adjusted for mother￿s ability, mother￿s AFQT, and broken home.21 Adjusting
for early family background factors substantially reduces gaps in ranks in noncognitive skills across income
and racial groups. Comparing adjusted cognitive and noncognitive test scores reveals the importance of
long-term factors in reducing the gaps in behavioral scores across these groups. Although noncognitive
ability gaps across income and racial groups cannot be fully eliminated by a regression adjustment, con-
trolling for mother￿s ability and education, family income, and family structure signi￿cantly reduces the
gaps in noncognitive abilities across these groups at both early and later ages. The experimental evidence
discussed in section 6 con￿rms that these ￿ndings on noncognitive skills have a causal basis. Indeed, the
21We ￿rst regress the Anti-Social score on mother￿s education, mother￿s AFQT, and broken home at the same age at which
the score is measured. We then rank individuals on the residuals of this regression and construct percentiles. We then include
family income in the regression as well as the other variables mentioned above before taking the residuals and constructing
the ranks.
18evidence across a variety of studies suggests that early childhood interventions aﬀect motivation and other
noncognitive skills.
This evidence suggests that good families (those with enriched parental environments) promote cogni-
tive, social, and behavioral skills. Weak families do not. This evidence is consistent with a large body of
evidence in sociology and economics (see, e.g., Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997). The relevant policy issue
is to determine what interventions in dysfunctional families, if any, are successful. The evidence presented
in section 6 addresses this question.
3 The Evidence on the Importance of Noncognitive Skills
Much of the neglect of noncognitive skills in analyses of earnings, schooling, and other life outcomes is
due to the lack of any reliable means of measuring them. Many diﬀerent personality traits are lumped
into the category of noncognitive skills. Psychologists have developed batteries of tests to measure these
skills (Sternberg, 1985). Companies use these tests to screen workers, but they are not yet widely used to
ascertain college readiness or to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of schools or reforms of schools. The literature
on cognitive tests ascertains that one dominant factor (￿g￿) summarizes cognitive tests and their eﬀects on
outcomes. No single factor has emerged as dominant in the literature on noncognitive skills and it is unlikely
that one will ever be found, given the diversity of traits subsumed under the category of noncognitive skills.
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2004), test and reject the ￿g￿ theory of noncognitive skills.
Studies by Bowles and Gintis (1976), Edwards (1976), and Klein, Spady and Weiss (1991) demonstrate
that job stability and dependability are the traits most valued by employers as ascertained by supervisor
ratings and questions of employers, although they present no direct evidence of the eﬀects of these traits on
wages and educational attainment. Perseverance, dependability and consistency are the most important
predictors of grades in school (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
19Self-reported measures of persistence, self-esteem, optimism, future orientedness, and the like are now
collected in major data sets, and some recent papers discuss estimates of the eﬀects of these measures on
earnings and schooling outcomes (see Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne, 2001; Duncan, Claessens, and Engel
2004). These studies shed new light on the importance of noncognitive skills for success in social life. Yet
these studies are not without controversy. For example, ex post assessments of self-esteem may be as much
the consequence as the cause of the measures being investigated.
Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) avoid the problems inherent in these ex post assessments by using
evidence from the GED testing program in the United States to demonstrate the quantitative importance
of noncognitive skills in determining earnings and educational attainment. The GED program is a second-
chance program that administers a battery of cognitive tests to self-selected high school dropouts to
determine whether or not their level of academic attainment is equivalent to that of high school graduates.
The GED examination is successful in psychometrically equating GED test takers with ordinary high
school graduates who do not go on to college. Recipients are as smart as ordinary high school graduates
who do not go on to college, where cognitive ability is measured by an average of cognitive components
of the AFQT or by the ￿rst principal component (￿g￿) derived from the components. According to these
same measures, GED recipients are smarter than other high school dropouts who do not obtain a GED (see
Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001). In the raw data, GED recipients earn more than ordinary high school
dropouts, have higher hourly wages, and ￿nish more years of high school before they drop out. This is
entirely consistent with the literature that emphasizes the importance of cognitive skills in determining
labor market outcomes.
When measured ability is controlled for, however, GED recipients earn the same as or less than other
dropouts. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) note that noncognitive skills play an important role in this
gap. GEDs have higher cognitive skills than dropouts but exhibit the same problems of self control and
self discipline exhibited by dropouts, and in some behaviors are worse than other dropouts.
20H e c k m a n ,S t i x r u da n dU r z u a( 2 0 0 4 )p r e s e n te v i d e n c et h a tb o t hc o g n i t i v ea n dn o n c o g n i t i v es k i l l sa ﬀect
schooling and the returns to schooling.22 They analyze the changes in the probabilities of various outcomes
that arise from altering cognitive or noncognitive abilities. Figure 6A, taken from their study, shows that
both higher levels of cognitive and noncognitive skills are associated with lower rates of attrition from high
school. For many outcome measures, increasing noncognitive ability over the same decile range as cognitive
ability has a greater eﬀect on outcomes than increasing cognitive ability over the same decile range.
Increasing noncognitive ability to the highest level reduces the probability of being a high school
dropout to virtually zero for females with average cognitive ability.23 This eﬀect is especially pronounced
at the bottom of the distribution (going up from the bottom ￿fth). The same arguments holds for other
behavioral outcomes. Increases in both types of ability have the same eﬀect on reducing the likelihood
of spending time in jail by age 30 (see Figure 6B). Figure 6C shows an analogous eﬀect for smoking.
Again, we see the same large eﬀect for females of increasing noncognitive ability. Figure 6D show this for
non-marital pregnancy outcomes. For this outcome, noncognitive ability seems to be more important than
cognitive components.24 Higher levels of noncognitive skills promote success on achievement tests even
when they do not aﬀect IQ. This eﬀect operates because noncognitive skills aﬀect schooling and schooling
raises measured achievement. (Hansen, Heckman and Mullen, 2004; Heckman, Larenas and Urzua, 2004).
Current systems of evaluating educational reforms are based predominantly on changes in scores on
22Cognitive and noncognitive abilities are estimated using a two-factor model and the NLSY79 data. The cognitive skill is
identi￿ed by using a subset of ￿ve Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests (word knowledge, paragraph
comprehension, numerical operations, coding speed and mathematics knowledge). The noncognitive factor is identi￿ed using
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem and Rotter Locus of Control scales. The Rosenberg scale contains ten statements of self-approval
and disapproval with which respondents are asked to strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree. A high score
indicates a high self-approval rating. The Rotter scale is based on four questions about the extent to which respondents
believe themselves to have control over the various domains of their lives. A higher score indicates more control over one￿s
life. All tests were administered in 1979-81, when the respondents were 14-24 years old. The estimation of the model is
carried out using an MCMC routine. Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua use only the young sample to analyze the data (the scores
are measured at least 3-4 years before the outcomes). They also show results from other data sets where the separation
between the age of the test and the outcome is more substantial, and they ￿nd very similar results. They apply the method
developed in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2004) to account for spurious feedback between outcomes and test scores.
23Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2004) show the same patterns apply to college attendance.
24Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2004) show the same pattern for other reproductive outcomes, such as marital childbearing.
21cognitive tests. These tests capture only one of the many skills required for a successful life (see Heck-
man, 1999). A more comprehensive evaluation of educational systems would account for their eﬀects on
producing the noncognitive traits that are also valued in the market. There is substantial evidence that
mentoring and motivational programs oriented toward disadvantaged teenagers are eﬀective. We review
this evidence in section 6.
Much of the eﬀectiveness of early childhood interventions comes from boosting noncognitive skills and
from fostering motivation.25 While IQ is fairly well set after the ￿rst decade of life, motivation and self-
discipline are more malleable at later ages (Heckman, 2000). More motivated children are more likely
to stay in school and have higher achievement tests. Our analysis suggests that social policy should
be more active in attempting to alter noncognitive traits, including values, especially for children from
disadvantaged environments who receive poor discipline and little encouragement at home. This more
active social policy approach would include mentoring programs and stricter enforcement of discipline in
the schools. Although these programs are controversial, they are likely to be eﬀective and to produce
substantial saving to society from reduced pathological behavior (see section 6.1).
We now turn to some evidence from animal and human populations that bolsters our case that early
factors matter and socioemotional skills, shaped at an early age, also matter.
4 Critical Periods, Sensitive Periods, and Socioemotional Bases
of Skill Formation and Remediation
Early experience exerts a profound in￿uence on socioemotional outcomes directly, but it also interacts with
genetic endowments, with consequences that are at least as important for development.26 Experimental
25See Karoly et al. (1998), Currie and Blau (2005), and Heckman (2000) for comprehensive reviews of the literature.
26A twins study by Turkheimer et al. (2003) found that in poor families, 60% of the variance in IQ is accounted for by
the shared environments, and the contribution of genes is close to zero, whereas in wealthy families a nearly opposite result
22studies using animals have produced several suggestive ￿ndings that enhance our understanding of the
evidence on human behavior. Suomi (1999) provides a summary of his research on the malleability of tem-
perament. He and his colleagues selectively bred rhesus monkeys to be highly fearful. They then reassigned
some of these infants to nurturing mothers, while pairing some normal infants with fearful mothers. Their
results suggest that normal infants do not take on their foster mother￿s fearful characteristics. Fearful in-
fants assigned to nurturing mothers become even more socially precocious than their normal counterparts.
They engage in autonomous exploration of their environment earlier and more frequently, and they do
not display disproportionate responses to minor alarming stimuli. When they are moved into larger social
groups, they are able to recruit allies and attain higher positions in the monkey hierarchy. Regardless of
their genetic background, young females acquired the nurturing style of their adoptive mother with their
own oﬀspring rather than the style predicted by their genetic pro￿le or own biological mother￿s behav-
ior. These results suggest that positive early experiences can dramatically modify genetic tendencies, as
expressed in behavior.
Knudsen (2004) shows that early experience can modify the biochemistry and architecture of neural
circuits (we discuss his work further in part III). When such experiences operate within a limited time frame
in the life cycle, that period is termed ￿sensitive.￿ During a sensitive period, certain patterns of connectivity
among neurons become stable as a result of environmental in￿uence. This stability is environmentally
adaptive.27 These pathways can be altered after the sensitive period, but their plasticity is limited by
the structure created during the sensitive period, i.e., it is less eﬃcient to invest in later periods. When
experience in a given period is crucial for normal development, that period is called ￿critical.￿ We formally
de￿ne sensitive and critical periods in part III. Intuitively, if late investment is a good substitute for early
is found.
27Knudsen (2004) argues that experience provides information about the individual and his environment that cannot be
predicted accurately and, therefore, cannot be encoded genetically. This may explain why the early experience of deprivation
may result in maladaptive development and corresponding behavior. In some sense, the adaptation may only be adaptive
locally, rather than globally.
23investment, the early years are not critical. If it is not a good substitute, then the early period is critical.
Critical periods have been extensively documented for development of binocular vision in the cortex
of mammals, auditory space processing in the midbrain of barn owls, ￿lial imprinting in the forebrain of
ducks and chickens, and song learning in the forebrain of songbirds (see Knudsen, 2004). For our purposes,
the most relevant example is language acquisition and the fact that children tend to perform better in
acquiring language skills than do adults, despite being more limited in most cognitive domains. Age of
exposure to a language is negatively related to ultimate pro￿ciency achieved in that language (see Newport,
2002, for a summary of the evidence). The decline in pro￿ciency begins as early as 4 and 6, and continues
until a plateau is reached in adulthood. This pattern is evident for many aspects of language pro￿ciency,
such as control over sounds as well as grammatical structure, and has been shown for both ￿rst and
second languages.28 However, not all aspects of language acquisition are equally sensitive. Newport (2002)
cites evidence that the acquisition of vocabulary and semantic processing can be accomplished relatively
easily even in adulthood, while the more formal dimensions of language (such as syntax, phonology, and
morphology) are less easily acquired. These diﬀerences are apparent even on a neurological level. In short,
both critical and sensitive periods are features of language learning.
Other types of social behavior are characterized by sensitive and critical periods. Independent research
by Cameron (2004) suggests that development of normal social behavior in infant rhesus monkeys can
be disrupted by removing the mother from the social group. When mothers and infants are separated
when the infants are one week old, their subsequent adult behavior is profoundly antisocial, anxious, and
aggressive. When the disruption takes place at a later age, the eﬀects are qualitatively diﬀerent and their
severity declines with age at separation. The impact on the youngest monkeys can be oﬀset by pairing
them with an experienced mother, but the degree of catch-up decreases with the age at which the ￿foster￿
28The age-of-exposure eﬀect appears even in the grammatical skills of deaf adults who learn sign language. See Pinker
(1994) and Newport (2002) for more on this topic.
24placement takes place. Remediation is possible, though its timing is crucial.
The monkeys who are emotionally secure explore more and learn more. This evidence shows how
noncognitive skills feed into the formation of cognitive skills. It helps to explain how the Perry Preschool
Program, discussed in section 6, which did not raise IQ but raised noncognitive skills, aﬀected achievement
test outcomes. We formalize the notion of critical and sensitive periods in part III and in the Appendix
to this paper. Closely related is the concept of a ￿bottleneck￿ period. If skills at one stage of the life cycle
are not formed at a suﬃciently high level, it is diﬃcult to proceed to excellence at the next stage. The
Leontief technology discussed in section 7 crystallizes this point.
It is important to understand how families invest in their children and why many youth do not pursue
a higher education despite the purportedly high returns. As we discuss next, children from disadvantaged
families often reach college-going ages without adequate preparation or skills to make college attendance
worthwhile. We turn to a discussion of the importance of credit constraints and other long-term family
factors on adolescent schooling decisions.
5 Interpreting The Role Of Family Income: The Evidence on
Credit Constraints
There is a strong relationship between family income and college attendance. Figure 7 displays aggregate
time series of college participation rates for eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old American males classi￿ed
by their parental income measured in the child￿s late adolescent years. There are substantial diﬀerences
in college participation rates across family income classes in each year. The cross sectional pattern of
schooling attendance by family income levels that is evident in this ￿gure is found in many other countries
(see the essays in Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993). In the late 1970s or early 1980s, college participation rates
began to increase in response to increasing returns to schooling, but only for youth from the top family
25income groups. With a lag, children for other groups also responded, but the gaps in rates did not close.
This diﬀerential educational response by income class threatens to perpetuate or widen income inequality
across generations and among racial and ethnic groups. See Figure 8 for the time-series evidence on college
attendance rates by race.
There are two diﬀerent, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, interpretations of this evidence. The
common and more in￿uential one is the most obvious one. Credit constraints facing families in a child￿s
adolescent years aﬀect the resources required to ￿nance a college education. A second interpretation
emphasizes the long-run factors associated with higher family income. It notes that family income is
strongly correlated over a child￿s life cycle. Families with high income in a child￿s adolescent years are
more likely to have high income before that period. Higher levels of family resources in a child￿s formative
years are associated with higher quality education and better environments that foster cognitive and
noncognitive skills.
Both interpretations of the evidence are consistent with a form of credit constraint. The ￿rst, more
common interpretation, is clearly compatible with this point of view. But the second interpretation is
consistent with another type of credit constraint: the inability of a child to buy the parental environments
and genes (or their substitutes) that form the cognitive and noncognitive abilities required for success in
school. Some parents may never earn enough to provide the best developmental environments for their
children.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002, 2003) argue on quantitative grounds that the inability of a child to acquire
the family resources provided to children by wealthy families is the most important factor underlying Figure
7. After controlling for the ability formed by the early teenage years, they show that parental income in
the adolescent years plays only a minor role in explaining college enrollment decisions. The evidence from
the U.S. presented in their research suggests that at most 8 percent of American adolescents are aﬀected
by short-term liquidity constraints that inhibit their participation in postsecondary schooling. Most of the
26family income gap in enrollment is due to long-term factors that produce the abilities needed to bene￿t
from participation in college.
The evidence reviewed here suggests that the ￿rst-order explanation for gaps in enrollment in college
by family income is long-run family factors that are crystallized in ability. Short-run income constraints
aﬀecting families during the child￿s college-going years play a role in creating these gaps, albeit a quantita-
tively minor one. There is scope for intervention to alleviate these short-term constraints and the returns
to carefully targeted interventions are potentially high. One should not expect to reduce the enrollment
gaps evident in Figure 7 substantially by eliminating such constraints.
5.1 Family Income and Enrollment in College
The argument that short-term family credit constraints are the most plausible explanation for the rela-
tionship depicted in Figure 7 starts by noting that human capital is diﬀerent from physical capital. There
is no asset market for human capital. People cannot sell rights to their future labor earnings to potential
lenders to secure ￿nancing for their human capital investments in the way that indentured servants once
￿nanced the cost of travel to the New World with their labor. Even if they could, there would be sub-
stantial problems in enforcing performance of contracts on future earnings given that persons control their
own labor supply and the eﬀort and quality of their work. The lack of collateral on the part of borrowers
and the inability to monitor eﬀort by lenders are widely cited reasons for current large-scale government
interventions to ￿nance education.
If people had to rely on their own resources to ￿nance all of their schooling costs the level of educational
attainment in society would be much lower. To the extent that subsidies do not cover the full costs of
college tuition, persons are forced to raise funds to pay tuition through private loans, through work while in
college, or through foregone consumption (see Keane and Wolpin, 2001). Such constraints may aﬀect the
choice of college quality, the content of the educational experience, the decision of when to enter college,
27the length of time it takes to complete schooling, and even graduation from college. Children from families
with higher incomes have access to resources that are not available to children from low-income families;
although children from higher-income families still depend on the good will of their parents to gain access to
these resources. Limited access to credit markets means that the costs of funds are higher for the children
of the poor, and this limits their enrollment in college.29 P r o p o n e n to ft h i sv i e wa r g u et h er e d u c t i o n si n
real income among parents in the bottom half of the family income distribution, coupled with a growth
in real tuition costs, has prevented low income whites and minorities from taking advantage of the rising
education premium.
An alternative interpretation of the same evidence is that long-run family and environmental factors
play a decisive role in shaping the ability and expectations of children. Families with higher levels of
resources produce higher-quality children who are better able to perform in school and take advantage of
the new market for skills.
Children whose parents have higher incomes have access to better-quality primary and secondary
schools. Children￿s tastes for education and their expectations about their life chances are shaped by
those of their parents. Educated parents are better able to develop scholastic aptitude in their children
by assisting and directing their studies. We have reviewed the evidence that ability gaps open up early
and are strongly related to family characteristics. The in￿uences of family factors present from birth
through adolescence accumulate to produce ability and college readiness. By the time individuals ￿nish
high school and their scholastic ability is largely determined, the scope of tuition policy for promoting
college attendance is greatly diminished.
The interpretation that stresses the role of family and the childhood environment in producing college
29Evidence on educational responses to tuition subsidies is sometimes mistakenly interpreted as evidence on credit con-
straints. The purchase of education is governed by the same principles that govern the purchase of other goods: the lower
the price, the more likely are people to buy the good. Dynarski (2000) presents recent evidence about the strength of tuition
eﬀects on college participation that is consistent with a long line of research. In addition, there is, undoubtedly, a consump-
tion component to education. Families with higher incomes may buy more of the good for their children and may buy higher
quality education as well. This will contribute to the relationship displayed in Figure 7.
28readiness does not necessarily rule out short-term borrowing constraints as a partial explanation for the
patterns revealed in Figure 7. However, if the ￿nances of poor but motivated families hinder them from
providing high quality elementary and secondary schooling for their children, and produce a low level of
college readiness, government policy aimed at reducing the short-term borrowing constraints for the college
expenses of those children during their college-going years is unlikely to be eﬀective in substantially closing
the gaps evident in Figure 7. In these circumstances, policies that improve the early environments that
shape ability will be more eﬀective in the long run.
The following experiment captures the essence of the distinction we are making. Suppose two poor
families participate in lotteries that are adjusted to have the same expected present value (at age zero of
the child) but have diﬀerent award dates. Markets are assumed to be imperfect in the sense that families
cannot borrow against the future awards. Compare a family that wins the lottery in the child￿s adolescent
years with a family that wins in the child￿s early formative years. The former child would lack all of the
bene￿ts of investment during the early childhood years that the child from the family that wins early
would receive. The child from the late-winning family would be likely to have lower levels of cognitive and
noncognitive abilities than the child from the early-winning family. To the extent that investments are
complementary and self-productive, the children of the early winner will be much more likely to attend
college. Although none of the data we possess are as clean as the data generated by this hypothetical
experiment, taken as a whole, they point in this direction.
5.2 Racial and Family Income Gaps: Long-Term Family Factors vs. Short-
Term Credit Constraints
A simple approach to testing the relative importance of long-run factors versus short-run credit constraints
in accounting for the evidence in Figure 7 is to condition on long-run factors and examine if there is any
29additional role for short-run credit constraints.
Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999, 2001) compare the estimated eﬀects of family background and
family income on college attendance, controlling for scholastic ability (as measured by the Armed Forces
Qualifying Test, or AFQT). Measured scholastic ability is in￿uenced by long-term family and environmental
factors, which are in turn produced by long-term family factors. To the extent that the in￿uence of family
income on college attendance is diminished by the inclusion of scholastic ability in an analysis of college
attendance, one would conclude that long-run family factors crystallized in AFQT scores are the driving
force behind schooling attainment, and not short-term credit constraints. Fitting a life cycle model of
schooling to a subsample of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data with AFQT measured
before high school graduation, Cameron and Heckman examine what portion of the gap between minority
youth and whites in school attendance at various levels is due to family income, to tuition costs, and to
family background.30 They ￿nd that when they do not control for ability measured at an early age, about
half (￿ve points) of the eleven-point gap between black and white college attendance rates is due to family
income; more than half (four points) of the seven-point diﬀerence between Hispanics and whites is due
to family income. When scholastic ability is accounted for, only one half of one point of the eleven-point
black-white gap is explained by family income. The gap between Hispanics and whites actually widens
when family income is included in the empirical model. Adjusting for ability at the age people enter
college more than accounts for minority-majority college attendance gaps. Cameron and Heckman obtain
comparable results when they adjust for parental education and family structure.31 The eﬀects of tuition
on college entry are greatly weakened when measures of ability are included. This analysis suggests that it
is long-run factors that determine college attendance, not short-term borrowing constraints, that explain
the evidence in Figure 7.
30See BLS (2001) for a description of the NLSY data.
31Cameron and Heckman condition on an early measure of ability not contaminated by the feedback from schooling to test
scores. Such feedback is documented in Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004).
30It is sometimes claimed that enrollment responses to tuition should be larger for constrained (low-
income) persons (see Kane, 1994, and the survey in Ellwood and Kane, 2000), although there is no
theoretical basis for this.32 Cameron and Heckman (1999) address this issue empirically. Even without
adjusting for AFQT, they ￿nd no pattern in the estimated tuition response by family income level. When
conditioning on ability, tuition eﬀects become smaller for everyone (in absolute value) and the in￿uence
of family become negligible. In a separate study of the HOPE Scholarship program in Georgia, Dynarski
(2000) ￿nds that the elasticity of enrollment to tuition subsidies among youth from middle- and high-
income families is as high as other estimates found in the literature for lower income youth. Middle- and
higher-income people do not respond less elastically to tuition subsidies than do lower-income people.
Based on NLSY79 data, Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the relative importance of family income and
academic ability in determining a number of college-related outcomes.33 Classifying white males by ability
(as measured by AFQT scores) results in a clear ordering that shows that more able people are more
likely to go to college than those who are less able. Within test score terciles, we further display college
enrollment rates by family income measured in the child￿s adolescent years. Inspecting the graphs on the
left (panels A, C, and E), we observe a clear ordering by family income within ability groups￿persons from
families with higher income are more likely to enroll in college. However, this does not necessarily mean
that short-run credit constraints are operative in the college-going years. Family income in the adolescent
years is strongly correlated with family income throughout the life cycle, and long-run family resources are
likely to produce many skills that are not fully captured by a single test score. When we control for early
family background factors (parental education, family structure, and place of residence), the relationship
between family income and school enrollment is greatly weakened for all college outcomes as the graphs
32Mulligan (1997) shows in the context of a Becker-Tomes model that tuition elasticities for human capital accumulation
are greater (in absolute value) for unconstrained people. His proof easily generalizes to more general preferences (results
are available on request from the authors). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) use a discrete choice schooling framework to
demonstrate that constrained persons may respond less than unconstrained persons.
33See Carneiro and Heckman (2002) for details.
31in the right hand side (panels B, D, and E) reveal. Adjusted gaps are much smaller than the unadjusted
ones.
Most of the analysis in the literature focuses on college enrollment and much less on other dimensions
of college attendance, such as completion, quality of school, and delay of entry into college.34 When we
perform a parallel analysis for completion of four-year college, we ￿nd no evidence of constraints for white
males and, in fact, over-adjust the gaps in college enrollment. Figures 9C and 9D present the raw and
adjusted gaps respectively, for completion of four-year college. Figures 9E and 9F show the raw and
adjusted gaps for delay of entry into college. There is no evidence of short-run credit constraints in these
measures. In results presented in Carneiro and Heckman (2003), there is evidence of short-run credit
constraints among the least able poor in completing two years of college, but not for the brightest poor.
Using the diﬀerence in each outcome between the highest income category and the lower income cate-
gories as a rough measure of the fraction of persons constrained, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) ￿nd that
there is weak evidence among certain subgroups for short-term credit constraints in years of entry delay
and for choice of two-year versus four-year colleges, a measure of school quality. Depending on the measure
of college participation selected, the estimated percentage of white males constrained ranges from 0 to 8
percent. Comparable results hold for other demographic groups.
The strongest evidence for short-term credit constraints is for Hispanic males. This is not surprising
since those in the country illegally are not eligible for the same schooling aid as legal residents. The weakest
evidence for credit constraints is for black males. On many measures, the eﬀective constraint for this group
is zero (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).
Many of the variables used to control for long-term family factors also predict family income in the
adolescent years. Does the preceding analysis simply project family income in adolescent years onto other
long term family factors? Carneiro and Heckman (2002) claim it does not. Independent variation in
34Work while attending school is studied in Keane and Wolpin (2001). Delay in entry is studied in Kane (1996).
32family income remains even after controlling for other family factors. When they reverse the roles of
family income and family background￿e.g., examining how diﬀerences in family background aﬀect college
enrollment rates after conditioning on family income levels￿a strong long-run family background eﬀect
remains. As Figure 9 shows, adjusting for family income in adolescent years does not substantially aﬀect
diﬀerences in college decisions by family background.
Tables 1A and 1B report further evidence on the unimportance of short-run credit constraints on
college attendance. Using data from the Children of the NLSY79 survey, they present estimates of child
enrollment in college on family per capita permanent income and on family per capita income ￿ows received
at various stages of the life cycle (transitory income). Permanent income is formed as an average discounted
income ￿ow to the family over the life of the child at home (ages 0 to 18).35 Two features are clear from
these Tables: (a) permanent income matters a lot for college enrollment and (b) given permanent income,
transitory income ￿ows matter little. This result is robust whether or not one controls for ability at age
12: compare Table 1A with Table 1B which does not control for ability at age 12. We discuss other studies
on the importance of the timing of family income in section 5.3.
Policies that improve the educational ￿nancing of identi￿ed constrained subgroups in the college-going
years will increase their human capital and may well be justi￿ed on objective cost-bene￿t criteria. The
potential economic loss from delay in entering college can be substantial. If V is the economic value of
attending school, and schooling is delayed one year, then the costs of delaying schooling by one year and
not earning any income, are rV
1+r,w h e r er i st h er a t eo fr e t u r n .F o rr =0 .10, which is not out of line with
estimates in the literature, this delay is 9 percent of the lifetime value of schooling (roughly $20,000 in 2004
dollars). For the identi￿ed constrained subgroups, the bene￿ts to reducing delay and promoting earlier
college completion, higher college quality and graduation are likely to be substantial even when earnings
net of disutility costs of work in the year of delay are taken into account.
35We obtain the same empirical patterns reported in the text whether or not we use per capita income measures.
33Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2004) examine the role of credit constraints in determining college
attrition at a small liberal arts college in Kentucky. Since the probability of dropping out of college diﬀers
substantially by family income in their sample, it is natural to ask whether this may be the result of
borrowing constraints. They utilize a unique set of questions asked of all survey respondents to infer the
role played by borrowing constraints in determining college attrition and the relationship between family
income and attrition. The survey asks whether students would like to borrow more money for school if
they could and, if so, how much they would like to borrow. They ￿nd that only 20% of the sample would
like to borrow more for school, and the median amount those individuals would like to borrow is only $500.
B a s e do nt h e s e￿ndings, they estimate that the inability to borrow plays little role in attrition decisions.
A few other studies have attempted to model borrowing constraints and schooling decisions more
explicitly. Cameron and Taber (2004) examine the empirical importance of borrowing constraints in a
model that incorporates the insight that borrowing constraints will in￿uence both schooling choices and
returns to schooling. Using a variety of methods, they ￿nd no evidence that borrowing constraints in the
adolescent years play a role in explaining the years of schooling attained by recent cohorts of American
youth. Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate a more formally explicit sequential dynamic model and reach the
same conclusion. Students are estimated to be constrained in the short-run, but alleviate the constraints
they face by working while in college. Relaxing the budget constraint barely aﬀects schooling decisions
but aﬀects work while in school. Neither study looks at delay or quality eﬀects, which have been found to
be quantitatively important.
In designing policies to alleviate short-term constraints, it is important to speci￿cally target the inter-
ventions toward the constrained in ways that previous programs have not. Broad-based policies generate
deadweight. For example, Dynarski (2001) and Cameron and Heckman (1999) estimate that 93 percent of
President Clinton￿s Hope Scholarship funds, which were directed toward middle-class families, were given
to children who would have attended school even without the program. Stanley (1999) studies the impact
34of the GI Bill on the college-going decisions of Korean War veterans and ￿nds that most college subsidies
under the bill were used by veterans from families in the top half of the socioeconomic distribution. In an
analysis of Georgia￿s HOPE Scholarship program, Dynarski (2000) ￿nds that most of the funds went to
middle- and high-income students. These studies all suggest that previous government attempts to ￿nance
c o l l e g eh a v ep r i m a r i l yb e n e ￿ted the most well-oﬀ with little impact on those most likely to be constrained.
This conclusion is further supported by simulations from the model of dynamic schooling choices in Keane
and Wolpin (2001).
While targeting those identi￿ed as constrained may be good policy, it is important not to lose sight of the
main factors accounting for diﬀerences in schooling attainment. Family background factors crystallized
in ability are the ￿rst-order factors explaining college attendance and completion gaps. Diﬀerences in
ability by family income groups appear at early ages and persist. They aﬀect schooling decisions and
wages. A major conclusion of the studies reviewed in this section is that the abilities decisive in producing
diﬀerentials in college attendance are shaped early in life.
Finally, Lochner and Monge (2004) argue that the current structure of the student lending system in the
U.S. minimizes the eﬀect of liquidity problems on college attendance decisions, even though it may severely
distort consumption patterns. This is because the student loan system directly links borrowing limits to
schooling expenditures, a feature neglected in most studies of credit constraints and schooling. That is,
students who spend more on college can borrow more as long as their total borrowing remains below an
upper limit set by government lending programs. While Staﬀord loan limits for dependent students are
limited to a cumulative amount of $23,000, students from poorer families can borrow up to an additional
$40,000 from the Perkins loan program in addition to any direct transfers from the Pell Grant program.
Finally, parents can borrow up to the student￿s determined need from the PLUS loan program.36 Thus,
36PLUS take-up rates are low relative to the roughly 50% take-up rates of other student loans. It is diﬃcult to know
whether this re￿ects a reluctance of parents to take on debt when students would choose to do so themselves if they could or
whether it re￿ects the fact that other lending and grants satisfy the needs of most students. Parents are not eligible for PLUS
35the eﬀective constraint on family borrowing for many college students is simply the amount needed for
tuition, fees, books, and room and board at the institution of choice. In this sense, college costs can be
fully covered by student loans.37 While students cannot borrow above and beyond the costs of college to
buy fancy cars or expensive apartments (even if their future prospects are bright and they would like to
consume more while in college), the constraints embodied in the federal student loan system tend not to
distort schooling decisions.38 The analysis of Lochner and Monge (2004) is entirely consistent with the
analysis and evidence in Keane and Wolpin (2001).39
5.3 Borrowing Constraints As Determinants of Family Investment In Chil-
dren
While many recent studies have analyzed the importance of borrowing constraints among college-age
students, very little attention has been given to the role played by borrowing constraints in determining
family investments in younger children. Two conceptually distinct types of constraints may limit family
investments in their younger children. First, parents may be unable to borrow against their children￿s
future income even if they can borrow against their own future income. This suggests that bright children
loans if they have a bad credit rating (they are eligible with no credit rating or a good one), but students with ineligible
parents are able to borrow considerably more (at the levels set for independent students) from the Staﬀord loan program
than other dependent students.
37While loans cannot be taken out to cover foregone earnings, room and board does not, strictly speaking, represent a cost
of college. To the extent that these roughly oﬀset each other for individuals who work a few hours a week during the school
year and full-time during the summer, the full costs of college, including direct and indirect costs, can be borrowed.
38Furthermore, the option for students to default on their student loans after leaving school may actually encourage some
of the least able to attend low quality colleges that oﬀer little net return. While this may sound farfetched, cohort default
rates reached 20% in the early 1990s. Many institutions had default rates above 50%.
39The take-up rate on Pell Grants and Perkins Loans targeted toward students from low-income families is low (Or￿eld,
1992). Many more people are eligible for support than those who claim it. Binding borrowing constraints are not a plausible
explanation for the lack of utilization of these potential resources. Kane (1999) suggests that nonmonetary costs of applying
for ￿nancial aid may be high, especially for low-income people, because the application process is complex. He argues
that decreasing these costs may be a more promising avenue for relaxing ￿nancing constraints for low-income people than
expanding existing programs. He provides no evidence, however, in support of this conjecture. An alternative explanation
consistent with our evidence is that many eligible persons perceive that even with a substantial tuition subsidy, the returns
to college education for them are too low to pay for the foregone earnings required to attend school. Risk aversion due to
the uncertainty of income ￿ows may also reduce the returns relative to the bene￿ts.
36born to poor parents may not receive the eﬃcient amount of investment because their parents will never
earn enough to pay for those investments. The timing of income receipts for the parents is irrelevant in
this case. Only the discounted present value of income matters. A second, more severe, constraint on
parents may limit them from borrowing fully against their own future income. This is the constraint most
commonly associated with the notion of borrowing constraints, and it implies that the timing of a parent￿s
income matters for child investment decisions. Parents who earn a smaller share of their lifetime income
when their children are young are likely to invest less in their young children. Two families with the same
lifetime income may make diﬀerent early investment decisions. These early investment decisions may aﬀect
later decisions on college attendance.
While it seems likely that the ￿rst form of constraint is relevant for most families, the empirical
importance of the second is a matter of some controversy. The obvious test for the second borrowing
constraint examines whether the timing of family income matters for child achievement and schooling
outcomes. Only a few studies speak to this issue. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997) use PSID data to
estimate the eﬀects of family income earned at diﬀerent stages of a child￿s life (ages 0-5, 6-10 and 11-15)
on ￿nal schooling outcomes. Both standard cross-sectional OLS and sibling ￿xed eﬀects models reveal
that early income (ages 0-5) has a signi￿cantly larger impact on years of completed schooling and high
school graduation rates than does income at later ages. Levy and Duncan (2000) report similar results
using the PSID and siblings ￿xed eﬀects models. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue that these ￿ndings
do not necessarily imply that timing matters, since one should discount income in all stages back to the
same base year. Otherwise, the income earned when a child is young is worth more than when the child
is older, simply because the latter needs to be discounted. When they control for the discounted present
value of lifetime income over the child￿s ages 0-18, they do not ￿nd any signi￿cant additional eﬀect of early
income on college enrollment decisions using data from the Children of the NLSY (recall our discussion of
Tables 1A and 1B). They conclude that the timing of parental income within the life cycle of the child is
37unimportant.
Caucutt and Lochner (2004) use the Children of NLSY79 to execute three tests for ascertaining whether
the timing of (discounted) family income aﬀects adolescent math and reading achievement levels. Their
estimates suggest that (i) income earned at earlier ages has a slightly larger (and statistically signi￿cant)
impact on adolescent test scores than does income earned at later ages, (ii) future income has less of an
eﬀect on current outcomes that does past income and (iii) the slope of a family￿s income pro￿le is negatively
related to test scores, even after controlling for the discounted present value of family income taken over a
twenty-year period. While most of their ￿ndings are consistent with the presence of constraints on parental
borrowing against their own income, none of them suggest that the timing of parental income within the
life cycle of the child plays a large role in determining child outcomes. Consistent with Carneiro and
Heckman (2003), their results suggest a strong eﬀect of permanent lifetime income on child development
outcomes.
Overall, the evidence on whether the timing of income matters on children￿s outcomes is mixed. While
some of the evidence suggests that timing does matter, some does not. Even those studies that suggest
a role for timing do not ￿nd large eﬀects. Because it is necessary to observe individuals over a long time
period in order to examine the role of income timing, most studies are based on a fairly small number of
individuals and are forced to make strong assumptions about the dynamic process by which income may
aﬀect achievement and schooling outcomes. Additional studies on this issue are certainly warranted to
explore the robustness of the ￿ndings to alternative speci￿cations.
385.4 High Rate of Return to Schooling Compared to the Return on Physical
Capital
Least squares estimates of the rate of return to schooling, based on the Mincer earnings function, are often
above 10 percent and sometimes are as high as 17 to 20 percent. Estimates based on instrumental variables
are even higher. (See, for example, the evidence surveyed by Card 1999; 2001; and the discussion of the
quality of the instruments used in this literature presented in Carneiro and Heckman, 2002 and in this
volume, Carneiro and Heckman, 2005). It is sometimes claimed that the returns to schooling are very high
relative to the returns to physical capital, and therefore people are credit-constrained or that some other
market failure is present.
The cross-sectional Mincer rate of return to schooling does not, in general, estimate the marginal
internal rate of return to schooling, and the internal rate of return is not well-de￿ned in sequential dynamic
programming models.40 Willis (1986) and Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) state the conditions under
which the Mincer rate of return will equal the marginal internal rate of return to schooling. The latter paper
shows that these assumptions are at odds with earnings data. Even if these conditions are satis￿ed, implicit
comparisons are usually made against a risk-free interest rate. However this is not the relevant comparison
for evaluating schooling decisions. Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2001, 2003), Cunha, Heckman and
Navarro (2005), and Navarro (2005) estimate that agents face considerable uncertainty in their returns to
schooling. The illiquidity and irreversibility of human capital investments drive the premium on human
capital far above the safe interest rate (see Judd, 2000). Consequently, comparisons of Mincer returns and
returns to capital are intrinsically uninformative about the existence of credit constraints or the need for
intervention in human capital markets. See Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Cunha, Heckman and Navarro
(2005), and Navarro (2005) for further discussion of this point.
40See Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) for examples in which cross-sectional
rates of return are uninformative about the return to schooling that any person experiences.
395.5 Are Rates of Return to Investment Higher for Persons From Low-Income
Families?
If low-income families are credit-constrained under conditions speci￿ed in Carneiro and Heckman (2002),
at the margin, the returns to schooling for children from constrained families should be higher, since they
are investing less than the eﬃcient amount.41 We develop this analysis formally in part III. Carneiro
and Heckman (2002) establish that if choices are made at the margin of schooling quality, the estimated
Mincer return may be lower for constrained persons, unless adjustments for schooling quality are made
in the estimated returns. The empirical literature on this topic, which does not adjust for quality, ￿nds
that returns to secondary schooling and post-secondary schooling are higher for high-ability people than
f o rl o w - a b i l i t yp e o p l e . ( S e e ,f o re x a m p l e ,M e g h i ra nd Palme 1999; Cawley et al., 2000; Taber 2001, or
the evidence presented in section 5.6.) Family income and child ability are positively correlated, so one
would expect higher returns to schooling for children of high-income families for this reason alone. Altonji
and Dunn (1996) ￿nd in their preferred empirical speci￿cation that the returns to schooling are higher
for children from more-educated families than for children of less-educated families. There is no evidence
that rates of return to secondary and postsecondary schooling are higher for children from low-income
families than for children from high-income families. Indeed all of the evidence points to returns in the
later stages of child schooling being higher for high ability children from more advantaged environments.
This is consistent with complementarity and self-productivity as discussed in part I. We elaborate on this
point in part III.
Interventions at very early ages, however, have higher returns for the most disadvantaged. This empir-
ical pattern holds across many studies. For example, this holds true for a nurse home visitation program
41Carneiro and Heckman (2002) show that for the prediction to be valid, it is necessary to assume that all families face the
same technology of schooling (relating inputs to outputs) and that there be no comparative advantage in the labor market.
Cameron and Taber (2004) derive a diﬀerent set of conditions.
40in Elmira, NY (Olds, 2002), where there was no signi￿cant eﬀect of the program on child socioeconomic
outcomes for the sample as a whole, but modest eﬀects were found for the disadvantaged subsample of
unmarried, young, and poor white mothers and their children, even at age 15. The nurse home visitation
program in Memphis replicated this pattern of results, though the overall eﬀects of treatment were much
weaker.42 The IHDP43 study of low-birth weight babies by Brooks-Gunn et al. (1992) ￿nds that the in-
crease in IQ is higher among children of poorly educated mothers.44 Non-experimental studies of preschool
by Magnuson et al. (2004a, b) and the Gormley et al. (2004) study of Oklahoma universal pre-K program
￿nd the eﬀect of preschool on achievement test scores to be higher among the disadvantaged children.
By the late adolescent years, the pattern is reversed and returns are lower for low ability and dis-
advantaged children. An equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ b e c o m e se v i d e n t . T h i si sc l e a ri nt h eh i g h e rr e t u r n s
to the most able in job training and in the military AFQT studies, both of which we summarize below.
This reversal in the pattern of returns to investment in disadvantaged persons is a consequence of the
technology of skill formation that we formalize in part III of this paper. Distinguishing returns from early
investment from returns to late investment reveals the value of self-productivity and complementarity as
useful conceptual tools for organizing the evidence on child development.
5.6 The Role of Ability in Returns to Schooling and in Choice of Post-School
Investment
Ability is not only a primary determinant of schooling decisions and hence earnings, but it also aﬀects the
return per unit of schooling as well as participation in job training. Table 2 gives our evidence on the eﬀect
42We discuss the evidence on other visitation programs in section 6.1.4.
43The Infant Health and Development Program was a randomized study of low-birthweight infants conducted at 8 sites
around the country. The treatment group received home visits by program staﬀ, child attendance at a child development
center, and parent group meetings. Both treatment and control children received medical, developmental, and social as-
sessments, with referral for pediatric care and other services. All services were provided at no cost to the families. The
intervention lasted until children were 36 months of age, adjusted for prematurity.
44However, any cognitive eﬀect of IHDP are almost entirely attenuated by age 8 (see McCarton et al.,1997).
41of ability on participation in post-school job training programs. For diﬀerent demographic groups it shows
the eﬀect of measured ability (AFQT) on participation in company training programs. More able people
are substantially more likely to participate in company training. Far from remediating credit constraints,
as they are sometimes conjectured to do, private-sector post-school investment programs reveal that those
who start with higher initial conditions make more investments throughout their lifetimes.
We have already discussed the evidence that the wage returns to schooling are higher for children from
the most advantaged environments. This evidence is consistent with complementarity and self-productivity.
Ability also aﬀects the economic return to schooling. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) study the economic
returns to college for people of diﬀerent ability (see Table 3). Those at the bottom 5% of the ability
distribution get half of the return to college of those at the top 5% of the ability distribution. Ability
also aﬀects wages independently of its eﬀect on schooling, as shown in Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov
(2005). This is further evidence on complementarity and self-productivity.
A strong connection between ability and job performance has been established in a series of studies
conducted for the military. The armed services rely heavily on aptitude testing to screen recruits. Aptitude
is de￿n e di nt e r m so fp e r f o r m a n c eo nt h eA r m e dF o r c e sQ u a l i ￿cation Test (AFQT), which is a subset of
the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Category I corresponds the highest ability level,
while V is the lowest, representing scores below the 10th percentile.45 Armor and Roll (1994) establish that
the test is predictive of true productivity and that initial de￿cits in productivity are not remedied by work
experience. Figure 11A shows the relationship between the percentage passing at a minimum qualifying
score on two job-performance tests and AFQT for the two largest combat specialties. The two tests are the
Skill Quali￿cation Test (SQT) for infantrymen and the Project 100,000 Test for armor crewmen.46 The
45Recruits whose scores fall in category V are ineligible for enlistment. Category I corresponds to AFQT scores in the
93-99th percentiles, II to 65-92th, IIIA to 50-64th, IIIB to 31-49th, IV to 10-30, and V to 1-9th.
46The Project 100,000 measure was a ￿eld test using real equipment of some task in which performance of each subtask
w a ss c o r e db ya no ﬃcer as correct or incorrect. The passing rate is set at 50% correct. The SQT includes a hands-on
performance test, a job knowledge test, and a certi￿cation component (e.g., ￿ring range quali￿cations). A score of 60%
correct is considered a minimum level of job pro￿ciency. This accounts for the gap between the two lines in the ￿gure.
42strong positive relationship between the tests is unambiguous. Moreover, job experience does not appear
to mediate these performance gaps substantially. Remediation through experience, which is sometimes
claimed to be eﬀective (Bruer, 1999), is actually ineﬀective in closing skill gaps. Early disadvantages are
not easily remedied by compensatory investments or work experience at later ages.
Figure 11B shows the link between time on the job and the average score on the hands-on performance
test developed by the Job Performance Measurement/Enlistment Standards Project (JPM) for ￿rst-term
soldiers from all four branches of the military. While the performance of soldiers at all ability levels
improves with experience, the diﬀerence between categories I-II and IV remains constant at approximately
one-half of a standard deviation. To put it diﬀerently, the average category IV soldier with three years of
experience performs at the level of a category IIIA soldier with one year of service.
Ability formed in the early years is also important in explaining crime, teenage pregnancy and a variety
of social pathologies. Figure 12A shows that women with low cognitive ability are more likely to bear
children when they are young. Figure 12B shows that men of low cognitive ability are more likely to spend
time in jail by the time they are 30. Figures 12C-D show that maternal ability is positively associated with
how much cognitive and emotional stimulation children receive. It appears that children for whom early
investment is crucial are the least likely to receive it. Maternal ability is a crucial ingredient in eliminating
test score gaps of children as demonstrated in section 2. Not only do less able women bear children at
earlier ages, but they propagate themselves across generations by investing less in their children.
We next turn to an analysis of the evidence on the eﬀectiveness of speci￿c policies in supplementing
the environments of disadvantaged children.
436 W h a ti sK n o w nA b o u tS p e c i ￿c Policies to Foster Ability and
Skill?
6.1 Early Interventions
Karoly et al. (1998), Currie (2001) and Currie and Blau (2005) present comprehensive surveys of numerous
preschool intervention programs targeted toward disadvantaged populations and their measured eﬀects.
The programs they analyze vary, both in terms of age of enrollment and age of exit. The eﬀects are generally
consistent, although in some cases they are quite weak.47 Generally, performance of children in school is
improved in terms of less grade repetition, more graduation and higher test scores. Unfortunately, many of
the evaluations of these programs do not follow children into late adolescence or adulthood. Interventions
at younger ages seem to produce larger eﬀects.48
Three programs have long-term follow-ups, and we focus on them here. They all targeted high-risk
children from disadvantaged families. The ￿rst is the High/Scope Perry Preschool, a half-day program on
a small scale in the Ypsilanti, MI public schools. Children were enrolled at age 4 and stayed in the program
until age 6. It was an experiment with a sample size of 123 and follow-up to age 40. The Abecedarian
program, the second one we consider, was a full-day, year-round educational child care program in Chapel
Hill, NC. Children entered at the age of 4 months and continued until age 8. It was evaluated by random-
ization and has 111 participants. Students are followed to age 21, and samples are still being collected.
The ￿nal program we consider is the Chicago Child-Parent Centers (CPC), a half-day program on a large
47For example, Currie and Thomas (2000) show that test score gains of participants in the Head Start program tend to
fade completely for blacks but not for whites. Their paper suggests that one reason may be that blacks attend worse schools
than whites, and therefore blacks are not able to maintain initial test score gains. However, Heckman, Larenas, and Urzua
(2004) dispute this ￿nding. Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) ￿nd comparable results. The Mathematica evaluation of
Early Head Start by Love et al. (2002) shows very modest eﬀects as well. However, Head Start is a considerably less intensive
program, which may explain why it has limited consequences for the developmental trajectories of disadvantaged children.
48Morris et al. (2005) ￿nd that the biggest impact of a parental wage-subsidy intervention on children￿s achievement is for
preschool children.
44scale in the Chicago public schools. It was a full-time program. It was evaluated by a non-experimental
method (matching) and has a sample of about 1,500 children. All three programs had some sort of parental
involvement component.
The programs diﬀer by duration and child age at entry. Abecedarian started with young children in
the ￿rst months of life. Perry and the CPC program start with older children, 3 or 4-5 years old. The
programs diﬀer in intensity. It is also important to point out that the comparison made in all of the studies
is between children with enriched preschool environments and children with ordinary early environments,
some of whom may attend preschool and kindergarten, albeit of a less intense variety.
6.1.1 Perry Preschool Experiment
The Perry preschool experiment was an intensive preschool program that was administered to 65 randomly
selected black children who were enrolled in the program over 5 diﬀerent waves between 1962 and 1967.
All the children came from Ypsilanti, MI. A control group of roughly the same size provides researchers
with an appropriate benchmark to evaluate the eﬀects of the preschool program.
The experimental group assignment was performed in the following way. Candidate families were
identi￿ed from a census of the families of the students attending the Perry school at the date of operation
of the program, neighborhood group referrals and door to door canvassing. Poor children who scored
between 75 and 85 on the standard Stanford-Binet IQ test were randomly divided into two undesignated
groups.49 The children were then transferred across groups to equalize the socioeconomic status, cognitive
ability (as measured by the IQ test) and gender composition of the samples. Finally, a coin was tossed
to determine which group received the treatment and which did not. Initially the treatment and control
groups included 64 children each, but the actual treatment and control groups contained 58 and 65 children,
49Poverty status was determined by a formula that considered rooms per person in the child￿s household, parental schooling
and occupational level. The IQ range was labeled as ￿borderline educable mentally retarded￿ by the state of Michigan at
the time of the experiment. Only children without an organic mental handicap were included in the study.
45respectively.50
Children entered the Perry School in ￿ve waves, starting with wave zero (of four-year-olds) and wave one
(of three-year-olds) in 1962, then waves two, three and four (of three-year-olds) entered in each subsequent
year through 1965. The average age at entry was 42.3 months. With the exception of wave zero, treatment
children spent two years attending the program. In the ￿nal year of the program, 11 three-year-olds who
were not included in the data attended the program with the 12 4-year-olds who were. About half of the
children were living with two parents. The average mother was 29 years old and completed 9.4 years of
school.
The treatment consisted of a daily 21
2 hour classroom session on weekday mornings and a weekly ninety
minute home visit by the teacher on weekday afternoons to involve the mother in the child￿s educational
process. The length of each preschool year was 30 weeks, beginning in mid-October and ending in May. Ten
female teachers ￿lled the four teaching positions over the course of the study, resulting in an average child-
teacher ratio of 5.7 for the duration of the program.51 All teachers were certi￿ed to teach in elementary,
early childhood or special education.52 If it were administered today, the Perry preschool program would
cost approximately $9,785 per participant per year in 2004 dollars.
50Some aspect of the assignment was clearly nonrandom and this has led some to call the Perry results into question.
First, younger children were assigned to the same group as their older siblings. Two treatment children were transferred
to the control group because their mothers were not able to participate in any classes or home visits because they were
employed far from home. Four treatment children left the program before completing the second year of preschool when
their families relocated, and one control child died. Thus, the ￿nal sample consisted of 123 children. The 123 children in
the sample came from 100 families. In the control group, 41 families contributed 1 child each, and 12 families contributed
2 children each. In the treatment group, 39 families contributed 1 child apiece, 6 families contributed 2 children apiece, 1
family contributed 3 and another 4 children. Assigning younger siblings to the same group eﬀectively made the family, rather
than the individual, the unit of analysis. Still, it is diﬃcult to argue that assigning siblings at random would have been a
better strategy. So-called spillovers to the control siblings from home visits would have been one possible source of bias since
mothers cannot be expected to treat siblings in accordance with their experimental status. Another potential source of bias
is spillover from one sibling to another. In any case, diﬀerences in background characteristics between the two experimental
groups are virtually nonexistent, with the exception of much higher rates of maternal employment at program entry in the
treatment group.
51This number is low relative to other early education experiments. For instance, the student-teacher ratio for the Chicago
Child-Parent Center and Expansion Program ranged from 8 to 12 (see Fuerst and Fuerst, 1993).
52Schweinhart et al. (1993) argue that the certi￿cation of the teachers is an important component in the success of the
Perry preschool.
466.1.2 Abecedarian Project
The Abecedarian Project recruited 111 children born between 1972 and 1977 whose 109 families scored
high on the High Risk Index.53 It enrolled families and intervened on children beginning a few months
after birth. Enrollment was based on the characteristics of the families more than on the characteristics
of the children, as in the Perry program. Virtually all of the children were Black, and their parents had
low levels of education, income, cognitive ability and high levels of pathological behavior. The children
were screened for mental retardation. 76% of the children lived in a single parent or multigenerational
household. The average mother in this group was less than 20 years old, completed 10 years of schooling
and had an IQ of 85. There were 4 cohorts of about 28 students each. By the time they were 6 weeks
old, the children were assigned randomly to either a preschool intervention or a control group. The mean
age of entry was 4.4 months. At age 5, just as they were about to enter kindergarten, all of the children
were reassigned to either a school age intervention through age 8 or to a control group. This yielded 4
groups: children who experienced no intervention at all, those who experienced an intervention when they
were young, those who experienced it when they were older, and ￿nally those who enjoyed a high-quality
intervention throughout their whole childhood. The children were followed up until age 21.
The Abecedarian intervention was more intensive than the Perry one. The preschool program was a
year-round, full-day intervention. The initial infant-to-teacher ratio was 3:1, though it grew to a child-to-
teacher ratio of 6:1 as the kids progressed through the program. Infants in the control group received an
iron-forti￿ed formula for 15 months and diapers as needed to create an incentive for participation. Many
of the control children were enrolled in preschool and/or kindergarten.
During the ￿rst 3 primary school years, a home-school teacher would meet with the parents and help
53The factors used to form the index consist of weighted measures of maternal and paternal education levels, family income,
absence of the father from the home, poor social or family support for the mother, indication that older siblings have academic
problems, the use of welfare, unskilled employment, low parental IQ, and family members who sought counseling or support
from various community agencies. Parental income and education were considered most important in calculating the index.
47them in providing supplemental educational activities at home. The teacher provided an individually-
tailored curriculum for each child. The target set for the parents was at least 15 minutes per day of
supplementary activities. This home-school teacher also served as a liaison between the ordinary teachers
and the family, and she would interact with the parents and the teachers about every two weeks. She would
also help the family deal with other issues that might improve their ability to care for the child, such as
￿nding employment, navigating the bureaucracy of social services agencies, and transporting children to
appointments. Data were collected regularly up to age 21.
6.1.3 Chicago Child-Parent Center Program
The Chicago Child-Parent Center was not evaluated by the method of random assignment but by the
method of matching treated children to comparable nontreated children on the basis of on age, eligibility
for intervention, and family socioeconomic status. It was started in 1967 in 11 public schools serving im-
poverished neighborhoods of Chicago. Using federal funds, the center provided half-day preschool program
for 3- and 4-year-olds during the 9 months that they were in school. The program provided an array of ser-
vices, including health and social services, and free meals. It also sought to include the parents, including
helping the parents complete school and participate in home visits and ￿e l dt r i p s .I n1 9 7 8 ,s t a t ef u n d i n g
became available, and the program was extended through third grade and included a full-day kindergarten
experience. Eventually, 24 centers provided preschool and after-school activities, up to second or third
grade. This is the period during which the sample analyzed by Reynolds et al. (2001) was enrolled in the
program. The preschool program ran 3 hours per day during the week for the 9 months that school was
in session, and usually included a 6-week summer program. During the kindergarten years, more services
were provided at the aﬃliated school. Teacher-child ratios were 17:2 for the preschool component and 25:2
for the kindergarten. Participation during the primary years was open to any child in the school. Program
participants experienced reduced class sizes of 25 pupils rather than the standard of 35 or more in the
48Chicago public schools. Teachers￿ aides, extra instructional materials, and enrichment activities were also
available. Some children continued to participate in CPC through age 9, for a maximum total of 6 years.
93% of the children were black and 7% were Hispanic.
6.1.4 The Eﬀects of Early Interventions
These and other studies of interventions for children from low-income families ￿nd that participants expe-
rienced increased achievement test scores, decreased grade retention, decreased time in special education,
decreased crime and delinquency and increased high school graduation. The gains vary with quality and
age at which the program is started, and there are important diﬀerences by the sex of the child.
Programs diﬀer in the measures they use to evaluate the outcomes and in their intensity and quality.
As a result, it is hard to compare the programs using a standard basket of bene￿ts. The CPC program,
which is less intensive, produced substantial eﬀects on high school graduation rates, reductions in special
(remedial) education, grade repetition and juvenile arrest (see Figure 13).
The Perry Preschool Program is the ￿agship experimental intervention study. Children are followed
through age 40. The initial boost in IQ faded by the time the children were in second grade (see Figure
14A), but the program had substantial eﬀects on educational achievement. Achievement test scores for the
treatment group were consistently and statistically signi￿cantly higher through age 14. Participants had
higher grades and were more likely to graduate from high school. Substantially less time was spent in special
education, and higher high school graduation rates were achieved by participants (Figure 14B). Participants
were more likely to be employed54 and to earn more (Figure 14C) and they were less dependent on welfare.
There was substantially less crime among participants (Figure 14D)￿both in terms of incidence and
severity, a recurrent ￿nding of early intervention programs. However, there was no statistically signi￿cant
diﬀerence in grade retention by age 27 between the two groups, although teenage pregnancy was lower,
54The diﬀerence in employment rates was only signi￿cant at age 19.
49and marriage rates were higher by age 27 for program participants.
The Abecedarian program boosted IQ, but its eﬀect is concentrated primarily among girls. Figure 15A
shows the overall IQ gap between treatments and controls. It is persistent over time.55 The Abecedarian
program intervenes in the very early years, and it is known that IQ is malleable when children are very
young (see, e.g., the discussion in Armor, 2003). This message is reinforced by the fact that the IQ boost
was not found among children who only experienced the later intervention. Comparable eﬀects are found
for reading scores (Figure 15B) and math achievement scores (Figure 15C). The test score eﬀects persist
through age 21, which is the last age analyzed in the reports available to us.
There were substantial academic bene￿ts as recorded in Figure 15D. Treatment group members par-
ticipated less in remedial special education at age 15 and repeated fewer grades at all ages. High school
graduation and four-year college participation rates were high. Participants were less likely to smoke and
had better jobs (see Figure 15E).
Table 4 presents estimated costs and bene￿ts of the Perry and Chicago programs with bene￿ts dis-
counted at a 3% rate. All ￿gures are in 2004 dollars. The bene￿ts vary among programs.56 Perry produced
some gain to parents in terms of reduced child care costs, and earnings gains for participants were substan-
tial. The K-12 bene￿t arises from the increment in student quality and a reduction in special education
costs. This bene￿t is substantial across all programs. The college/adult category represents the extra
tuition paid by students who go to college. Crime represents the reduction in direct costs (incarceration
and criminal justice system) as well as damage done to victims. This excludes transfers. Welfare eﬀects are
modest. Future Generation (FG) Earnings represents the improvement in the earnings of the descendents
of the program participants.
Smoking and health bene￿ts were not measured in the Perry and Chicago data. For Abecedarian, there
55The decline in IQ over time for both groups is a consequence of the ￿Flynn Eﬀect￿ (see Flynn, 1987). Scores are normed
against national averages, but over cohorts IQ is increasing.
56There is a cost bene￿t study of the Abecedarian program (Barnett and Masse, 2002), but it is highly speculative, so that
we did not include it here.
50were substantial eﬀects, including major diﬀerences in smoking rates. CPC documents a decline in child
abuse and the costs of treating abused children. The costs of Perry were substantial but per year were
about the average cost of expenditure on public school students. CPC per year costs about $6,796 for the
preschool and $3,428 for the school-age component (in $2004). The bene￿t cost ratios are substantial: 9
to 1 for Perry; 8 to 1 for Chicago CPC. By projecting from the age 27 results, Rolnick and Grunewald
(2003) estimate that the annual rate of return for Perry is 4% for participants and 12% for society at large.
Bel￿eld et al. (2004) use the data on Perry participants through age 40 to estimate that the rate of return
for the participants and the general public as a whole is 18.4%. The rate varies by sex of the participants:
the rate of return for males alone is 21.9%, while for the rate for females is only 12.6%.57
Some of the home visitation programs for low-income young mothers have been shown to have modest
eﬀects on maternal and oﬀspring behavior and health.58 Olds (2002) summarizes two randomized trials
in Elmira, NY and Memphis, TN, which served predominantly rural white and urban black populations,
respectively. The treatment in both trials involved a series of pre- and postnatal home visits of poor,
unmarried, and young women by specially-trained nurses.59 The visits typically lasted 75-90 minutes, and
nurses spent more time with women they deemed to have higher needs. The target areas for this intervention
were health related behavior during and after pregnancy, childcare skills, and personal development (family
planning, education, job search assistance).
The Elmira treatment group made better use of community services and exhibited reduced prenatal-
period smoking, with 75% fewer premature deliveries among smokers. At ages 3-4, children whose mothers
57Excluding the bene￿ts of the program for the participants, the rate for the general public alone is 16.9%. Bel￿eld et al.
(2004) do not calculate a rate of return for participants only because they do not bear any signi￿cant costs of the program.
The rate for the general public on investing in males and females separately is 21.0% and 7.6%, respectively. The greater
return for men comes from the eﬀect of the intervention on crime, a predominantly male activity.
58Gomby et al. (1999) and Brooks-Gunn et al. (2000) show much more modest eﬀects of home visitation programs, though
these implementations are considerably less intensive.
59Only women who were pregnant with their ￿rst child were eligible. The mean frequency of nurse visits in the prenatal
and postnatal (age 0-2) stages were 9 and 23 for Elmira, and 7 and 27 for Memphis. The treatment group was divided into
two subgroups, where the ￿rst received only prenatal visits. The control group was also divided. See Olds (2002) for more
details on the intervention.
51smoked 10 or more cigarettes during pregnancy had a mean IQ of 4.5 points lower than women who
smoked 0-9 cigarettes. Among the 14- to 16-year-old treatment women, the newborn children were almost
400 grams heavier relative to the children of the control women. The bene￿cial eﬀects of the program were
especially apparent for the most disadvantaged women (i.e., young, poor, and unmarried).60 After the birth
of the child, the disadvantaged mothers who were visited showed better parenting skills and higher quality
of the home environment. They also had 80% fewer veri￿ed cases of child abuse and neglect. Children
of visited mothers had 32% fewer visits to the emergency room, and this eﬀect persisted after the end of
the program, though the diﬀerences in abuse and neglect faded.61 The disadvantaged subsample of the
treatment group had fewer subsequent pregnancies, longer periods between births, and greater employment
rates. These eﬀects were also evident by the time the child was 15. The children of the disadvantaged
women reported fewer instances of running away, less criminal activity, promiscuous sexual behavior and
smoking. Both parents and children reported less use of drugs and alcohol. Importantly, there were no
diﬀerences in other behavioral problems. A cost-bene￿t analysis of the Elmira trial by Karoly et al. (1998)
suggests that the program was very successful for low-income, unmarried women. Extrapolating from the
results at age 15, the bene￿ts of the program were 4 times its costs. The program paid for itself before
the child￿s fourth birthday, with the primary savings coming from reduced welfare and criminal justice
expenditures, as well as increases in tax revenue. However, the program provided no net savings for the
sample as a whole, suggesting that targeting, rather than universal provision, is appropriate.
The eﬀects for the Memphis trial were considerably weaker, even for the disadvantaged subsample.
There were no eﬀects on birth outcomes and parenting skills. Many fewer women smoked in this sample,
s oa n yr e d u c t i o n sw e r ev e r ys m a l l . T h es a m em a yb et h ec a s ef o rc h i l da b u s ea n dn e g l e c t . C h i l d r e no f
visited women had fewer health-care visits, especially among the disadvantaged subsample. In the ￿rst 2
60This result is common among many studies. Brooks-Gunn et al. (1992), Magnuson et al. (2004a, 2004b), and Gormley
et al. (2004) ￿nd higher eﬀects for the disadvantaged population.
61This may have been due to improved reporting of abuse by the nurses.
52years of life, more visited mothers attempted breast feeding. At age 4, there were no diﬀerences in mental
development or reported behavior problems. Visited mothers reported fewer subsequent pregnancies. There
were no diﬀerences in employment and some evidence of reduced AFDC and Food Stamp use. The children
are still too young to perform a reliable cost-bene￿t analysis on their outcomes.
Much more research is needed on Perry, CPC, and a wide variety of other early childhood program
results (shown in Tables 5 and 6). These samples and measurements need to be placed in a common
analytical framework to better understand the diﬀerences in samples, treatments, and eﬀects. For exam-
ple, are the persistent Abecedarian eﬀects on IQ due to the intensity or the age (4 months) at which the
intervention is administered? How important are home visitation eﬀorts? Joint analysis of the multiplicity
of generally favorable treatment outcomes using method sa p p r o p r i a t ef o rt h es m a l ls a m p l e st h a ta r ea v a i l -
able, needs to be applied to supplement analyses of one-at-a-time outcome measure studies. A much more
careful analysis of the eﬀects of scaling up the model programs to the target population, and its eﬀects on
costs, has to be undertaken before these estimates can be considered de￿nitive.
6.1.5 Extreme Deprivation and Remediation
Institutional rearing of children, insofar as it tends to be exceptionally poor, provides scientists with a
unique natural experiment that can be used to ascertain the eﬀects of severe environmental deprivation.
Evidence on children from such environments allows us to answer questions about the developmental
consequences of negative early experience and how amenable exposed children are to interventions such
as foster care. It may also enable us to learn if there are critical or sensitive periods for development,
which would have important implications for the relationship between the timing of an intervention and
the extent of its success. Some good evidence on this issue comes from the longitudinal studies of initially
institutionalized Romanian infants and toddlers who were later placed into foster care abroad. In this
section, we will outline the historical context for these studies, some of their results, and the implications
53that these data have for our model of human development.
The Ceau‚ sescu regime in Romania, which was in power from 1966 to 1989, attempted to enlarge
the country￿s workforce by increasing the birth rate.62 Virtually all types of abortion were criminalized,
and divorce was made much more diﬃcult. Contraceptives were neither manufactured domestically nor
imported. Progressive income taxes on childless adults over 25 were imposed. Monthly cash subsidies
were awarded to families with children, and the average allowance per child rose as family size increased.
Various labor laws eased working conditions for pregnant and nursing mothers by eliminating overtime and
night work entirely, and by reducing physically demanding work. Over three months of paid maternity
leave was available, as were additional breaks or reductions in work hours of up to two hours per day. Early
retirement was available for women as a function of the number of children they raised to age 10. Increasing
economic hardship coupled with Ceau‚ sescu￿s goal of paying oﬀ all international debt by imposing rationing,
obliged many women to work outside the home. Since childcare for the young (or any other alternative)
was scarce, many children were simply abandoned.
Institutionalization of children was not stigmatized, and was even encouraged oﬃcially. When the
Ceau‚ sescu regime fell in 1989, there were roughly 170,000 children in 700 overcrowded state institutions
(see Rosapepe, 2001). While no rigorous statistics on the conditions in these homes are available, foreign
visitors described the situation as appalling (see Rutter et al., 1998; Rosapepe, 2001). Children remained
in their cots all day, with no toys or other types of stimulation. Caregiving and personalized aﬀection were
all but nonexistent. Many young children were fed only gruel from bottles that were propped up, and some
continued to have diﬃculty even chewing solid food some years later. Orphanages were frequently located
in remote areas of the country; some children were transferred far away from where they were born and
were ￿lost￿ in the system. By the late 1980s, many institutions had no hot water, no constant heat during
winter, no diapers or even detergent. Medical supplies, including antibiotics and syringe needles, were
62Moskoﬀ (1980) enumerates the regime￿s pronatalist policies.
54extremely scarce. Children were often tied down or locked in rooms to keep them under control and some
were abused. While the prevalence and incidence of these problems are unknown, most children exhibited
a range of emotional, behavioral and medical problems when they were adopted abroad.
Several studies have been conducted to evaluate the eﬀects of interventions at various ages on these
children. The largest study of this sort was completed in the UK by Michael Rutter, his colleagues and
the English and Romanian Adoptees Study Team. The most recent results are summarized in O￿Connor
et al. (2000). This group studied 165 children who were adopted from Romania into UK families between
1990 and 1992 and compared them at ages 4 and 6 to 52 a d o p t e dc h i l d r e nf r o mw i t h i nt h eU Kw h ow e r e
all placed before age 6 months.63 Selected results are shown in Table 7. Rutter et al. (1998) show that
at the time of adoption, the orphans showed substantial developmental retardation, malnutrition, and a
range of health problems. Relative to ordinary English children, half of the Romanian orphans were below
the third percentile on weight, and over a third were below the third percentile on height. The overall
mean score on the Denver developmental quotient was 63, indicating mild retardation.64 Interestingly,
there were no signi￿cant diﬀerences in weight or Denver scale by age of adoption. By age 4,o n l y2% of the
orphans were below the third percentile on weight, and only 1% was below that threshold on height. The
extent of catch-up to British adoptees on the Denver developmental quotient was greater for the orphans
who entered foster care before they were 6 months of age.65 At age 6, the same result was obtained.66 The
63Only 87% of the Romanian children were adopted from institutions. The others came from a family setting, but there
were no diﬀerences in origin by age at the time of adoption. It is true, however, that the non-institutionalized children
exhibited fewer problems.
64The Denver Developmental Scales were used to conduct this assessment. Parents were asked to recall speci￿cb e h a v i o r
(e.g., standing while holding on to something, lifting the head, making meaningful ￿da-da￿ sounds) at the time of adoption.
The majority of parents used baby books that recorded these developmental milestones, which made recollection much better.
See Rutter et al. (1998) for more details on the analysis.
65The mean Denver scale for within-UK adoptees was 117.7( SD =2 4 .3), 115.7( SD =2 3 .4) for Romanians adopted before
6 months, and 96.7( SD =2 1 .3) for those adopted when they were between 6 and 24 months of age. See Rutter et al. (1998).
66O￿Connor et al. (2000) add a third group of Romanian children who were adopted between the ages of 24 to 42 months.
This group exhibits the worst performance on the Denver scale. Due to ceiling eﬀects, the Denver scale is not meaningful
at age 6, so O￿Connor et al. (2000) use the presence of impairment (de￿ned as a score below 70) as a test criterion. For
within-UK adoptees, only 2% (SD =1 )qualify as impaired. The corresponding percentages for the Romanians adopted
before 6, 6 − 24 and 24 − 42 months are 0( SD =0 ) , 5( SD =2 ) ,a n d18 (SD =7 ) .S e eO ￿ C o n n o ret al. (2000).
55same pattern appears to hold for cognitive development at ages 4 and 6, as measured using the McCarthy
General Cognitive Index.67
Romanian orphans who were adopted into UK families from an environment of severe early deprivation
exhibited remarkable improvement. This recovery was characterized by a negative linear dose-response
relationship with the duration (or perhaps severity) of the exposure to poor pre and postnatal environments.
The children who caught up to ordinary UK adoptees were the ones who were adopted before 6 months of
age. This shows the importance of early vs. late intervention that we have documented throughout this
chapter. This evidence is also consistent with the notion that early environments are a sensitive, rather
than a critical period of development for many child outcomes. Had the interventions occurred later in the
life of the children, it is likely that they would have been less eﬀective.
6.2 Intervention in the Adolescent Years
How eﬀective are interventions in the adolescent years? Is it possible to remedy the consequences of neglect
in the early years? These questions are relevant because cognitive abilities are fairly well determined and
stable by age 10 in the sense that IQ at later ages is highly correlated with IQ at age 10. Just as early
intervention programs have a high payoﬀ primarily from the social skills and motivation they impart to
the child and the improved home environment they produce, so do interventions that operate during the
adolescent years.
Tables 8 and 9 summarize evidence on the eﬀects of adolescent interventions on education, earnings, and
crime rates. There are few estimates of rates of return for these programs. School-based and training-based
programs are compared in the table. We brie￿y discuss what is known about school-based interventions
during the adolescent years. A few recent studies of mentoring programs like Big Brothers/Big Sisters
67The GCI is the total score on the McCarthy Scales of Children￿s Abilities. It summarizes verbal, quantitative, perceptual,
and memory performance.
56(BB/BS) and Philadelphia Futures Sponsor-A-Scholar (SAS) have shown that these programs have broad
positive social and academic impacts on participating school-aged children and adolescents. The BB/BS
program pairs unrelated adult volunteers with youth from single-parent households for the purpose of
providing youth with an adult friend. This activity promotes private youth development and surrogate
parenthood. No speci￿ca t t e m p t sw e r em a d et oa m e l i o r a t ep a r t i c u l a rd e ￿ciencies or to reach speci￿c
educational goals. A broad, supportive role is envisioned for the mentor.
In a random-assignment study, Tierney and Grossman (1995) found that eighteen months after being
matched with a mentor, Little Brothers and Sisters (ages 10 to 16 at the time of the match) were less
likely to have initiated drug or alcohol use, to hit someone, to skip class or a day of school, or to lie to
their parents; they had higher average grades and were more likely to feel competent in their school work
a n dr e p o r tab e t t e rr e l a t i o n s h i pw i t ht h e i rp a r e n t s .
The primary goal of Sponsor-A-Scholar (SAS) was to help students from Philadelphia public high
schools make it to college. The program provides long-term mentoring (throughout high school and for one
year beyond), substantial academic support, help with college application and ￿nancial-aid procedures, and
￿nancial support for college-related expenses. Individually matched mentors served as surrogate parents,
provided a successful role model, monitored student progress, and provided encouragement and support.
SAS provided students with $6,000 in ￿nancial assistance throughout college for those choosing to enroll
in an accredited two- or four-year postsecondary institution. The program also provided a coordinator for
groups of about thirty students to ensure a successful relationship is built between mentors and students.
Using a matched sample of non-SAS students in Philadelphia high schools, Johnson (1996) estimates
statistically signi￿cant increases in grade point averages for tenth and eleventh grades, as well as a 22
percent (16 percent) increase in college attendance one year (two years) after graduation from high school.
Because the primary goal of SAS is to increase college enrollment, Johnson did not collect other social and
psychological measures.
57Much like SAS, the Quantum Opportunity Program (QOP) oﬀered disadvantaged minority students
counseling and ￿nancial incentives (one dollar up front and one dollar put in a college fund) for every hour
spent in activities aimed at improving social and market skills. Students who were randomly chosen to
participate in the program were provided with a mentor at the beginning of ninth grade. All participants
were kept in the program for four years regardless of whether they stayed in school. Over four years,
the average participant logged 1,286 hours of educational activities like studying with tutors or visiting
museums. Two years after program completion, about a third more participating students graduated from
high school (or obtained a GED) than similar nonparticipants. Since many participants were enrolled
in postsecondary schooling at the time of the follow-up study, it is diﬃcult to determine the program￿s
eﬀect on earnings. Arrest rates for program participants, however, were one-half those for nonparticipants.
These bene￿ts did not come without substantial expenditures, however, as the average four-year cost per
participant was $10,600. Still, a cost-bene￿t analysis estimated positive net social returns to QOP. (See
Taggart, 1995 for a more detailed description of the program and an evaluation of its impacts). Tables 8
and 9 present evidence from a randomized-trial evaluation of the QOP program. Again, the evidence shows
that QOP and programs like it can dramatically improve social skills and the adaptation of adolescents
to society. However, these programs do not produce miracles. The recent evaluation of QOP by Max￿eld
et al. (2003) found that the program did not improve grades or achievement test scores and the eﬀect on
risky behaviors was ambiguous. It was also more eﬀective for teens from the middle of the eligible grade
distribution than for enrollees at the top or bottom of the distribution. There was considerable variability
in eﬀect by program site.
Two other studies provide additional evidence that creative programs designed to keep adolescents
in school can be eﬀective. These are discussed more extensively in Heckman (2000) and Heckman and
Lochner (2000), and we brie￿y summarize these discussions here. Ohio￿s Learning, Earning, and Parenting
(LEAP) program and the Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD) provided ￿nancial incentives for teenage
58parents on welfare to stay in school or take GED classes (or, alternatively, imposed ￿nancial penalties for
nonenrollment). LEAP showed increases in high school graduation or GED rates among randomly assigned
participants who were still enrolled in school when they entered the program. TPD showed mixed results
on educational attainment depending on the program site. Young women who had already dropped out
of school at the time of enrollment in the program (and, to a lesser extent, those who were still attending
school when they entered the program) may have substituted GED training for high school graduation as
an easier way to meet program requirements, raising concerns about an unintended, potentially negative
eﬀect. Both of these programs show positive post-program eﬀects on earnings and employment for students
who were still in school when they entered the program. The estimated eﬀects were often negative, however,
for participants who had already dropped out of school before entering the program. Both studies thus
show more positive impacts for individuals still enrolled in school than for dropouts. It is still unknown
whether the eﬀects of the programs are more positive for those still in school because, on average, they
are of higher ability than those who have already dropped out, or because there is some advantage to
intervening before adolescents leave school.
The available schooling literature demonstrates that providing disadvantaged students with ￿nancial
incentives to stay in school and participate in learning activities can increase schooling and improve em-
ployment outcomes. It should be noted that although programs providing such incentives have proven
to in￿uence employment and earnings positively (and, in the case of QOP, to reduce crime), they do not
perform miracles. The impacts they achieve are modest, but positive.
The Summer Training and Employment Program (STEP) provided remedial academic education and
summer jobs to disadvantaged youth ages 14 and 15. Each summer, participants enrolled in 110 hours of
classes and 90 hours of part-time work. Although program participants achieved modest short-term gains
in reading and math skills, those gains did not last. Two to three years after program completion, program
participation was found to have no eﬀects on high school graduation rates, grades, or employment (see
59Table 10). The program has been criticized for not attempting to follow up on its summer program with
a school year curriculum. Maryland￿s Tomorrow program did just that: it combined an intensive summer
program with a school year follow-up, oﬀering participants summer jobs and academic instruction, career
guidance, and counseling through adult mentors, peer support, or tutoring. Although the program did not
reduce ￿nal attrition rates, it did seem to delay attrition (dropout rates were lower for program participants
during the ninth grade but not by the end of the twelfth grade). The program also increased the pass
rate for twelfth grade students taking the Maryland Functional Tests, a series of tests of basic skills (see
Heckman and Lochner, 2000).
There is also some non-experimental evidence that Catholic secondary schooling is associated with
increased college participation among urban students, especially minorities (see Grogger and Neal, 2000).
This increase does not appear to be accompanied by large gains in math scores, at least for the groups
whose attainment is most aﬀected. This is consistent with our hypothesis that adolescent interventions
alter noncognitive skills but have weaker eﬀects on cognitive skills. Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005)
￿nd a similar pattern that attendance at Catholic schools raises high school graduation rates and, more
tentatively, promotes college attendance but has no eﬀect on test scores.
The evidence on programs aimed at increasing the skills and earnings of disadvantaged youth suggests
that sustained interventions targeted at adolescents still enrolled in school can positively aﬀect learning and
subsequent employment and earnings. The studies discussed in this section also suggest that interventions
for dropouts are much less successful. One plausible interpretation, consistent with other evidence reported
in this chapter, is that those who choose to drop out have less motivation and lower ability, making programs
less eﬀective for them regardless of when the intervention takes place. It is important to note, however,
that the interventions conducted by such programs only alleviate and do not reverse early damage caused
by low quality family environments.
606.3 The Eﬀectiveness of Late Adolescent and Young Adult Remediation
Programs
The evidence from public job training and second chance programs like the GED suggests that remediation
targeted towards children from disadvantaged environments is costly and at current expenditure levels is
ineﬀective (see the evidence in Heckman, 2006). Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) survey evaluations
of public job training programs in the United States. Returns are low (and sometimes negative) and even
when they are positive they do not lift most persons treated out of poverty. Similar evidence is reported
for remediation eﬀorts in public schools. As we discussed above, the return to GED certi￿cation is very
low. While the return to private sector on-the-job training is high, access to such training is diﬃcult for
the less able and the disadvantaged (recall Table 3). Adolescent remediation programs are eﬀective for a
targeted few who use them as second chance opportunities. They are not eﬀective for the rest.
Some look to public schooling as a way to remedy early ability de￿cits and to alleviate disadvantage
in endowments. Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) and Heckman, Larenas and Urzua (2004) address
this issue. They use a variety of methods to control for the endogeneity of schooling. All methods show
that schooling, while it raises measured ability, does not eliminate gaps between children from diﬀerent
racial and economic strata, and if anything widens them. This evidence parallels the evidence on military
experience and productivity discussed in section 5.6. Experience raises performance but does not close
gaps.
Figures 16A-B, taken from Heckman, Larenas and Urzua (2004), show how schooling raises achievement
test scores at diﬀerent levels of ability. These authors use the methodology of Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen
(2004) to isolate causal eﬀects of schooling on AFQT test scores, holding pure cognitive ability constant.
Their analysis is based on longitudinal data to measure the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of schooling attained
a tt h ed a t et h et e s ti st a k e no na c h i e v e m e n tf o rp e o p l ew h oa l le v e n t u a l l yg e tt h es a m es c h o o l i n g . F o r
61all major demographic groups, initial (ninth grade) test score gaps are maintained regardless of schooling
level. Schooling raises test scores, but it does not equalize them. These results persist even after controlling
for measures of schooling quality. One cannot count on schooling to eliminate early test score de￿cits. On
the other hand, one cannot blame schools for widening initial test score gaps.
The evidence reviewed in part II points to the empirical importance of self-productivity and comple-
mentarity. Skill begets skill. Later remediation of early skill de￿cits can be costly. This evidence supports
the qualitative conclusions of Figures 1A and 1B that returns to investment are higher for the young and
t h ed i s a d v a n t a g e d . W en e x tp r e s e n tam o r ef o r m a lm o d e lo ft h et e c h n o l o g yo fs k i l lf o r m a t i o nt h a ti sa
starting point for the theoretical uni￿cation of a scattered literature on treatment eﬀects that presents
￿eﬀects￿ for diﬀerent programs in diﬀerent environments directed towards diﬀerent clientele.
Part III
Using the Technology of Skill Formation to
Explain the Evidence
7A M o d e l o f S k i l l F o r m a t i o n
We use simple economic models to organize the evidence presented in part II as summarized in Figures
1A and 1B. We de￿ne the concepts of recursive productivity or ￿self-productivity￿ and complementarity
and show how the skill multiplier (as de￿ned in this section) and the notion of complementarity help to
organize the empirical evidence surveyed in part II. These concepts are essential for understanding why
early interventions are more eﬀective than later interventions and why there is no trade-oﬀ between equity
62and eﬃciency in the early years of childhood but why there is such a trade-oﬀ in the later years.
In the models presented in this section, parents make decisions about their children. We ignore how the
parents get to be who they are and the decisions of the children about their own children. We develop a
more generationally consistent model in section 8, after developing the basic framework of the technology
of skill formation.
Suppose that there are two periods in a child￿s life, ￿1￿a n d￿ 2￿, before the child becomes an adult.
Adulthood is a distinct third period. The child works for a ￿xed number of periods after the two periods
of childhood. Models based on the analysis of Becker and Tomes (1986) assume only one period of
childhood. We assume that there are two kinds of skills: SC and SN. For example, SC can be thought of
as cognitive skill and SN as noncognitive skill. Our treatment of ability is in contrast to the view of the
traditional literature on human capital formation that views IQ as innate ability. In our analysis, IQ is
just another skill. What diﬀerentiates IQ from other cognitive and noncognitive skills is that IQ is subject
to accumulation during critical periods. That is, parental and social interventions can increase the IQ of
the child, but they can do so successfully only for a limited time. Recall our evidence that an enriched
early intervention like the Abecedarian program raised IQ but Head Start and Perry Preschool ￿ directed
towards later ages ￿ did not. Compare Figure 15A for the Abecedarian program with Figure 14A for the
later-intervention Perry program.68
Let Ik
t denote parental investments in child skill k at period t, k = C,N and t =1 ,2. Let h be the
level of human capital as the child starts adulthood. It depends on both components of (SC
2 ,SN
2 ). The
parents fully control the investment of the child. A richer model, developed in Cunha and Heckman (2004),
incorporates, among other features, investment decisions of the child as in￿uenced by the parent through
preference formation processes.
68One has to be careful in making this comparison because the Abecedarian program was much more intensive. One cannot
separate out the eﬀect that Abecedarian started at 4 months age (as opposed to Perry￿s 3-4 years) from the greater resource
intensity of the Abecedarian program.













denote the vector of skill or ability stocks. The












for k = C,N and t =1 ,2. We assume that fk
t is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave
in Ik
t .69 In this model, stocks of both skills and abilities produce next period skills and the productivity of
investments. Cognitive skills can promote the formation of noncognitive skills and vice versa.
















. This model assumes
t h a tt h e r ei sn oc o m p a r a t i v ea d v a n t a g ei nt h el a b o rm a r k e to ri nl i f ei t s e l f . 70































> 0 for some S0,I
C
1 .
This says that investments in C a r ep r o d u c t i v ei np e r i o d1b u tn o ti np e r i o d2 .I nt h ea n a l y s i so fp a r tI I ,
69Twice continuous diﬀerentiability is a convenience.
70Thus we rule out one potentially important avenue of compensation that agents can specialize in tasks that do not require
the skills in which they are de￿cient. In the Appendix and in Part I, we present a more general task function that captures
the notion that diﬀerent tasks require diﬀerent combinations of skills and abilities.
64t h ee a r l yp e r i o d s( b e f o r ea g e8 )a r ec r i t i c a lp e r i o d sf or IQ but not for achievement tests or for noncognitive
skills.

















Thus 1 is a sensitive period if, at the same level of inputs, investment is more productive in stage 1
than in stage 2. The evidence in part II suggests that early investments in both cognitive and noncognitive
abilities and skills are more productive than later investments.
As de￿ned in the introduction, and clari￿ed in the Appendix, direct complementarity of skill l acquired







Early stocks of abilities and skills promote later skill acquisition by making it more productive. Students
with greater early cognitive and noncognitive abilities are more eﬃcient in later learning of both cogni-
tive and noncognitive skills. Thus the enriched early environments of the Abecedarian, Perry and CPC
programs promote greater eﬃciency in learning in high schools and reduce problem behaviors. See the
evidence in Figures 13-15 on reduction in remedial education and problem behavior for the treatment group
in these programs.
This technology also is suﬃciently rich to capture learning phenomena in rodents and rhesus monkeys
documented by Meaney (2001) and Cameron (2004). Emotionally nurturing early environments create pre-
conditions for later cognitive learning. More emotionally secure young animals explore their environments
more actively and learn more quickly. This is an instance of complementarity.
65To ￿x ideas, consider the following specialization of our model. Ignore the eﬀect of initial conditions




























































1 ≥ γ1 ≥ 0
1 ≥ γ2 ≥ 0


































1 ≥ φ1 ≥ 0
1 ≥ φ2 ≥ 0
1 ≥ 1 − φ1 − φ2 ≥ 0
, (6)
where 1
1−α is the elasticity of substitution in the inputs producing SC
2 and 1
1−σ is the elasticity of substitution
of inputs in producing SN





1 ) irrespective of the substitution parameters α and σ, except in limiting cases.
The CES technology is well known and has convenient properties. It imposes direct complementarity
66even though inputs may be more or less substitutable depending on α or σ.71 We distinguish between
direct complementarity and CES-substitution/complementarity in this section. Focusing on the technology
for producing SC
2 , when α =1 , the inputs are perfect substitutes in the intuitive use of that term (the
elasticity of substitution is in￿nite). The inputs SC
1 ,SN
1 and IC
2 can be ordered by their relative productivity
in producing SC
2 . The higher γ1 and γ2, the higher the productivity of SC
1 and SN
1 respectively. When
α = −∞, the elasticity of substitution is zero. All inputs are required in the same proportion to produce
a given level of output so there are no possibilities for technical substitution, and
S
C











In this technology, early investments are a bottleneck for later investment. Compensation for adverse early
environments through late investments is impossible. These polar cases generalize the cases developed in
Part I.
The evidence from numerous studies previously cited shows that IQ is no longer malleable after age
10. Taken at face value, this implies that if SC is IQ, for all values of IC
2 , SC
2 = SC
1 . Period 1 is a critical







For parameterization (5), this is obtained by imposing γ1+ γ2 =1 .
The evidence on adolescent interventions surveyed in part II shows substantial positive results for
noncognitive skills (SN
2 ) and at most modest gains for cognitive skills. Technologies (5) and (6) can
rationalize this pattern. Since the populations targeted by adolescent intervention studies tend to come
from families with poor backgrounds, we would expect IC
1 and IN
1 to be below average. Thus, SC
1 and
71S e ef o o t n o t e1 3i nP a r tI .
67SN
1 will be below average. Interventions make IC
2 and IN
2 relatively large for the treatment group in
comparison to the control group in the adolescent intervention experiments. At stage 2, SC
2 (cognitive
ability) is essentially the same in the control and treatment groups, while SN
2 (noncognitive ability) is
higher for the treated group. Large values of (γ1 + γ2) (associated with a small coeﬃcient on IC
2 )o rs m a l l
values of (φ1 + φ2) (so the coeﬃcient on IN
2 is large) and high values of α and σ can produce this pattern.
Another case that rationalizes the evidence is when α →− ∞and σ =1 . Under these conditions:
S
C


















1 +( 1− φ1 − φ2)I
N
2 . (8)
















is ineﬀective in incrementing
the stock of cognitive skills. Period 1 is a bottleneck period. Unless suﬃcient skill investments are made
in SC in period 1, it is not possible to raise skill SC in period 2. This phenomenon does not appear in the
production of the noncognitive skill, provided that (1 − φ1 − φ2) > 0. More generally, the higher σ and the
larger (1 − φ1 − φ2), the more productive is investment IN
2 in producing SN
2 .
To complete the CES example, assume that adult human capital h is a CES function of the two skills
















where ρ ∈ (0,1), τ ∈ [0,1],a n dφ ∈ (−∞,1]. In this parameterization, 1
1−φ is the elasticity of substitution
across diﬀerent skills in the production of adult human capital. Equation (9) reminds us that the market,
or life in general, requires use of multiple skills. Being smart isn￿t everything. In general, diﬀerent tasks
68require these skills in diﬀerent proportions. One way to remedy early skill de￿cits is to make compensatory
investments. Another way is to motivate people from disadvantaged environments to pursue tasks that do
not require the skill that deprived early environments do not produce. A richer theory would account for
this choice of tasks and its implications for remediation.72 For the sake of simplifying the argument, we
work with equation (9) that captures the notion that skills can trade oﬀ against each other in producing
eﬀective people. Highly motivated, but not very bright, people may be just as eﬀective as bright but
unmotivated people. That is one of the lessons from the GED program. (See Heckman and Rubinstein,
2001.)
T h ea n a l y s i si ss i m p l i ￿ed by assuming that investments are general in nature: IC
1 = IN
1 = I1, IC
2 =
IN
2 = I2.73 Cunha and Heckman (2004) develop the more general case of skill-speci￿c investments which
requires substantially more notational complexity.
With common investment goods, we can solve out for SC
1 and SN




2 = {(γ1 + γ2)(I1)







2 = {(φ1 + φ2)(I1)




If we then substitute these expressions into the production function for adult human capital (9), we obtain
h =
‰
τ [￿ γ (I1)
α +( 1− ￿ γ)(I2)
α]
φ














where ￿ γ = γ1 + γ2, ￿ φ = φ1 + φ2. Equation (12) expresses adult human capital as a function of the entire
72We sketch such a model in the Appendix.
73Thus when a parent buys a book in the ￿rst period of childhood, this book may be an investment in all kinds of skills. It
is an investment in cognitive skills, as it helps the child get exposure to language and new words. It can also be an investment
in noncognitive skills, if the book may contain a message on the importance of being persistent and patient.
69sequence of childhood investments in human capital. Current investments in human capital are combined
with the past stock of skills in order to increment the stock of these skills.
A conveniently simple formulation of the problem arises if we assume that α = σ = φ so that CES
substitution among inputs in producing outputs and CES substitution among skill in producing human












where γ = τ￿ γ +(1− τ) ￿ φ and φ = α = σ. The parameter γ is a skill multiplier. It arises because I1 aﬀects
the accumulation of SC
1 and SN
1 . These stocks of skills in turn aﬀect the productivity of I2 in forming SC
2 and
SN
2 .T h u sγ captures the net eﬀect of I1 on h t h r o u g hb o t hs e l f - p r o d u c t i v i t ya n dd i r e c tc o m p l e m e n t a r i t y . 74
1
1−φ is a measure of how easy it is to substitute between I1 and I2 where the substitution arises from
both the task performance (human capital) function in equation (9) and the technology of skill formation.
Within the CES technology, φ is a measure of the ease of substitution of inputs. In this analytically
convenient case, the parameter φ plays a dual role. First, it informs us how easily one can substitute
across diﬀerent skills in order to produce one unit of adult human capital h. Second, it also represents the
degree of complementarity (or substitutability) between early and late investments in producing skills. In
this second role, the parameter φ dictates how easy it is to compensate for low levels of stage 1 skills in
producing late skills.










= sign(ρ − φ).
This de￿nition of complementarity is to be distinguished from the notion based on the elasticity of substitution between I1
and I2,w h i c hi s 1
1−φ.W h e n φ<0, I1 and I2 are sometimes called complements. When φ>0, I1 and I2 are sometimes
called substitutes. When ρ =1 , I1 and I2 are always direct complements, but if 1 >φ>0, they are CES substitutes.
70In principle, compensation can come through two channels: (i) through skill investment or (ii) through
choice of market activities, substituting de￿cits in one skill by the relative abundance in the other through
choice of tasks. We do not develop the second channel of compensation in this chapter, deferring it to later
work.
When φ is small, low early investments I1 are not easily remediated by investments I2 in producing
human capital. The other face of CES complementarity is that when φ is small, high early investments
should be followed with high late investments. In the extreme case when φ →− ∞ , (13) converges to
h =( m i n{I1,I 2})
ρ, which case we analyzed in part I. Note that the Leontief case contrasts with the case
of perfect CES substitutes, which arises when φ =1 : h =[ γI1 +( 1− γ)I2]
ρ . When we impose the further
restriction that γ = 1
2, we generate the model that is implicitly assumed in the literature of human capital
investments that collapse childhood in a single period. In this special case the only thing that matters is
the total amount of human capital investments, regardless of how it is distributed across childhood periods.
In the case of perfect CES substitutes, it is possible in a physical productivity sense, to compensate for
early investment de￿cits by later investments, although it may not be economically eﬃcient to do so.
When ρ =1 ,w ec a nr e w r i t e( 1 3 )a s
h = I1
'
γ +( 1− γ)ω
φ“ 1
φ ,
where ω = I2/I1. Fixing I1 (early investment), an increase in ω i st h es a m ea sa ni n c r e a s ei nI2.T h e









For ω>1 and γ<1, marginal productivity is increasing in φ and (1 − γ). Thus, provided that late
71investments are greater than earlier investments, the more substitutable I2 is with I1 (the higher φ)a n d
the lower the skill multiplier γ, the more productive are late investments. Figure 17A graphs the isoquants
for ∂h
∂ω.I ts h o w st h a tah i g hφ trades oﬀ with a high γ.A s(φ,1 − γ) increases along a ray, ∂h
∂ω increases. For
a ￿xed skill multiplier γ,t h eh i g h e rφ, the higher the marginal productivity of second period investment. If,
however, ω<1,t h e n∂h
∂ω could be decreasing as (φ,1 − γ) increases along a ray and the trade-oﬀ between






If I1 is large relative to I2 (i.e., ω<1),f o ra￿xed γ the marginal product of I2 is decreasing in φ.
More CES complementarity implies greater productivity (see Figure 17B)75. The empirically relevant case
for the analysis of investment in disadvantaged children is ω>1, so greater CES-substitutability and a
smaller skill multiplier produce a higher marginal productivity of remedial second period investment.
It is important to distinguish the case when it is technologically eﬃcient to compensate for adverse
early environments from the case when it is economically eﬃc i e n tt od os o .I fγ is near 1, it may be very
costly to remediate shortfalls in early investments even though it is technically possible to do so. We return
to this point below.
In analyzing the optimal timing of investment, it is convenient to work with the technology embodied
in (13). We now show how the ratio of early to late investments varies as a function of φ, γ, and ρ. Consider
the following model in which parents maximize the present value of net wealth of their children.76 In order
to do that, parents decide how much to invest in period ￿1,￿ I1, h o wm u c ht oi n v e s ti np e r i o d￿ 2 , ￿I2, and
how much to transfer in risk-free assets, b, given total parental resources M. Period ￿1￿ could include in
utero investments. Parents cannot extract resources from children, so b ≥ 0. From period ￿3￿ to period
T, the age of retirement from the workforce, persons are assumed to work full time. Let r denote the
time-invariant interest rate, set exogenously and assumed to be constant for all periods, and let q denote
75One can show that at suﬃciently low values of φ, the marginal productivity is no longer increasing in φ.
76This setup is overly simplistic but allows us to focus on the important points. See Caucutt and Lochner (2004), Cunha
(2004) and Cunha and Heckman (2004) for more general models.











Lifetime earnings of children when they start working at period ￿3￿ are given by qg(I1,I 2),w h e r eg is
the function determining the adult stock of human capital. Discounted to period 1, the present value of
lifetime earnings is
q

















2b = M, (14)
and the constraint that parents cannot leave negative bequests to their children
b ≥ 0, (15)
where g(I1,I 2) is as de￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 3 )a n di sc o n c a v ei nI1 and I2.
When φ =1 , early and late investments are perfect CES substitutes. The optimal investment strategy
for this technology in this simple environment is straightforward. The price of early investment is $1.T h e
price of the late investment is $ 1
(1+r). Thus the parents can purchase (1 + r) units of I2 for every unit
of I1. The amount of human capital produced from one unit of I1 is γ,w h i l e$(1+r) of I2 produces
(1 + r)(1− γ) units of human capital. Therefore, the parent invests early if γ>(1 − γ)(1+r) and
77We abstract from endogenously determined on-the-job training, learning-by-doing, and assume that agents supply labor
inelastically.
73late otherwise. Two forces act in opposite directions. High productivity of initial investment (the skill
multiplier) drives the agent toward making early investments. Intertemporal prices (the interest rate) drive
the agent to invest late. It is optimal to invest early if γ>1+r
2+r.
As φ →− ∞ , the CES production function converges to the Leontief case and the optimal investment
strategy is to set I1 = I2. CES complementarity dominates and the pro￿l eo fi n v e s t m e n t si ss u c ht h a t
I1
I2 converges to one. In this extreme case, CES complementarity has a dual face. Investments in the
young are essential. At the same time, later investments are needed to harvest early investments. On
eﬃciency grounds, early disadvantages should be perpetuated, and compensatory investments at later
ages are economically ineﬃcient.
For −∞ <φ<1, the ￿rst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient given concavity of the technology
in terms of I1 and I2.L e tμ,λ denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with restrictions (14) and (15),




























2 = μ, (17)
μ − 1=λ(1 + r)
2 . (18)
Notice that if restriction (15) is not binding, then λ =0 , μ =1and optimal early and late investments are
only functions of (q,r). In this case, unconstrained families that make bequests will all invest the same in
their children. The only diﬀerence is in the transfers of assets to their children. If MA >M B then bA >b B.










74Figure 18 plots the ratio of early to late investments as a function of the skill multiplier γ, under diﬀerent
values of the complementarity parameter φ. When φ →− ∞ , we obtain the Leontief technology and
there is high CES-complementarity between early and late investments. In this case, the ratio is not
sensitive to variations in γ.CES-complementarity dominates, and the optimal investment pro￿le distributes





In this case, from equation (19), I1
I2 is close to zero for low values of γ, but explodes to in￿nity as γ
approaches one.






















log(1 + r). (20)
This expression does not depend on ρ. In the special case γ = 1+r
2+r, investment will be the same in both
periods regardless of the value assumed by φ. More generally, the growth rate of investments over time
varies with the complementarity between early and late investments, φ, with the skill multiplier for human
capital, γ, and with the interest rate. Ceteris paribus, the higher the CES complementarity, (i.e., the lower
φ), the lower the growth rate of investments over time. The reason is that if investments complement each
other strongly, optimality implies that they should be equal. Ceteris paribus, the higher the skill multiplier,
γ, the lower the growth rate of investments should be over time. Intuitively, if early investments have a
substantial impact in determining future stocks of human capital, optimality implies that early investments
should also be high. Finally, the higher the interest rate, the higher the growth rate of investments. This
result re￿ects the opportunity costs of investing today relative to investing tomorrow. The higher the
75interest rate today, the cheaper it is to postpone investments.
The lessons we take from this simple analysis are summarized in Table 10. When CES complementarity
is high, the skill multiplier γ plays a limited role in shaping the ratio of early to late investments. High
early investments should be followed by high late investments. As the degree of CES complementarity
decreases, the role of the skill multiplier increases, and the higher the multiplier, the more investments
should be concentrated in early ages.
This simple model also has implications for the timing of interventions. If MA >M B and family
A is unconstrained while family B is constrained, then for family B, λB > 0, μB =
£
1+λB (1 + r)
2⁄
.
Consequently, in equilibrium, the marginal return to one dollar invested in the poor child from family
B is above the marginal return to the same dollar invested in the rich child from family A, so family B
underinvests compared to the less constrained family A.
T h e r ei sn ot r a d e - o ﬀ between equity and eﬃciency in early childhood investments. Government policies
to promote early accumulation of human capital should be targeted to the children of poor families.
However, the optimal second period intervention for a child from a disadvantaged environment depends
critically on the nature of human capital aggregation and function (13), the technology of skill production.
If I1 and I2 are perfect CES complements, then a low level of I1 cannot be compensated at any level of
investment by a high I2.
On the other hand, suppose that φ =1 , so the reduced form technology can be written with inputs as
perfect CES substitutes:
h =[ γI1 +( 1− γ)I2]
ρ , 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. (21)
Then a second-period intervention can, in principle, eliminate initial skill de￿cits (low values of I1). At
as u ﬃciently high level of second-period investment, it is technically possible to oﬀset low ￿rst period
investments. However, it may not be cost eﬀective to do so. For example, if ρ =1and q(1 − γ) < 1+r,
76then the gains from future earnings do not justify the costs of investment. It would be more eﬃcient to
give the child a bond that earns interest rather than to invest in human capital in order to put the child
at a certain level of income.
We previously discussed the concepts of critical and sensitive periods in terms of the technical possi-
bilities of remediation. These were de￿ned in terms of the technology of skill formation. Here, we consider
the net eﬀects operating through investment and market substitution. The higher φ, the greater are the
possibilities for alleviating early disadvantage. When φ =1 , as in this example, it is always technically
possible to remediate early disadvantage. But it may not be economically eﬃcient to do so. From an
economic point of view, critical and sensitive periods should be de￿n e di nt e r m so ft h ec o s t sa n dr e t u r n s
of remediation, and not solely in terms of technical possibilities. We next embed the technology developed
in this section into a market setting where choices and credit constraints can be clearly articulated.
8 The Technology of Skill Formation in Overlapping Genera-
tions Economies
In this section we embed the technology (13) developed in the preceding section into simple dynamic
economies. These simple economies serve as baselines for the discussion of two conceptually distinct
market failures: credit constraints in a deterministic economy, and an economy with incomplete markets
with uncertainty in the labor market, as analyzed in Cunha (2004), Cunha and Heckman (2004) and
subsequent work by Caucutt and Lochner (2004).
8.1 Generational Structure and the Human Capital Production Function
The environment we consider is an overlapping generations economy with an in￿nite number of periods,
each one denoted t ∈ {0,1,2,...}. Each agent lives for four periods. In the ￿rst period of his life, the agent
77is a young child. In the second period of his life the agent is an adolescent. In the third period of his life,
the agent is a young adult (and has a child of his own). In the fourth period of his life the agent is an old
adult. At the end of the old adult period, the agent dies and is replaced by the generation of his grandchild.
Note that in every period there are agents of every possible demographic type (child, adolescent, young
adult and old adult). Life goes on in the future in similar fashion. Table 11 describes the demographics of
the economy.
8.2 Formalizing the Problem of the Agent
First, we describe the way agents go through life. Children and adolescents do not work. They only receive
investments in human capital which may include components of their consumption. When they become
young adults they conceive one child. In this setup, neither children nor adolescents have volition and
make no economic decisions at this stage of their life cycles. As long as parents￿ and children￿s objectives
are aligned, this assumption is not crucial, but a more general model would allow for child volition and
parental actions to promote preference alignment through incentives (Akabayashi, 1996 and Weinberg,
2001).
The young parent starts the third period of his life with a stock of human capital (or eﬃciency units) h,
an inheritance in the form of physical assets b, a n dg i v e sb i r t ht oo n ec h i l d . We assume that labor supply is
perfectly inelastic, so that the labor income of the parents is given by wh,w h e r ew i st h ew a g er a t eo fo n e
eﬃciency unit. Because the focus is on steady states, we assume that wt = w for all t =0 ,1,2,....G i v e n
h and b, the young parent chooses consumption when young and old, (cy,c o);early and late investments,
(I1,I 2), in the human capital of his child; and how much to bequeath in physical capital to his child, b0.
The agent￿s problem is to maximize the value of their lifetime utility de￿ned as









cy + I1 +
s
1+r
= wh + b, (22)
co + I2 +
b0
1+r
= wh+ s, (23)
and technology (13).
Cunha and Heckman (2004) close the model by introducing a ￿rm that operates under a constant
returns to scale technology and uses both human and physical capital to produce a good that can be
used for consumption, human capital investment, or physical capital investment. In this chapter, we focus
our attention on the behavior of investments in the child￿s human capital in an economy in which the
equilibrium allocation is ￿rst best.
In this simple economy, the equation describing the ratio of the marginal productivity of investments










Thus, the main conclusions of the simple, static model developed in section 7 are valid in a more fully
speci￿ed economic environment.
9 The Technology of Skill Formation In a Model with Credit
Constraints
We now study how the technology of skill formation aﬀects investment in human capital when we intro-
duce market imperfections into the economy just described. Caucutt and Lochner (2004) use a general
technology to analyze how the interaction between the technology of skill formation and credit constraints
79during diﬀerent periods aﬀects the life cycle pro￿le of the sequence of investments in human capital. They
assume that parents make monetary transfers to children every period. These transfers cannot be neg-
ative. Parents cannot extract resources from children. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on the
implications for the pro￿le of investments when there exists a limit d ≥ 0 on how much parents can borrow




Allocations over time will depend on whether or not borrowing constraints bind. Taking the ￿rst-order





where λ ≥ 0 represents the Lagrange multiplier on debt constraint. If β(1 + r)=1and technology is






























Note that in comparison to ￿rst order condition (20), we acquire a new term, given by the growth rate
of the marginal utility of consumption, which re￿ects the severity of credit constraints. Investment in
children will increase at a faster rate (or, decrease at a slower rate) with age among constrained families
than among unconstrained families.
The eﬀects of early constraints on later investment decisions will depend on the CES-complementarity
or substitutability of investment across ages. When investments are very CES-substitutable, families will
tend to respond to early constraints by re-allocating investments to later periods. In this case, investments
80during constrained periods should decline a lot, while investments at later ages should increase to partially
oﬀset any reductions in human capital. On the other hand, when investments are very CES-complementary
over time, any reduction in early investments makes later investments less productive. If investments are
strongly complementary, investment may decline at all ages in response to constraints that only bind for
af e w .
10 The Technology of Skill Formation In a Model with Market
Incompleteness
We now consider a stochastic version of this model with incomplete markets, following the analyses of
Cunha (2004) and Cunha and Heckman (2004).78 We focus here on the assumption that parental earnings
are subject to temporary idiosyncratic shocks ε (when parents are young) and η (when parents are old).
T h es u p p o r to fε is given by the interval [εmin,ε max], with εmin > 0. The distribution of ε is given by Fε.
Similarly, we have that the support of η is given by the interval [ηmin,ηmax], with ηmin > 0. The distribution
of η is given by Fη. The market failure in their analysis is that there are no markets that allow agents to
insure against realizations of ε or η. Furthermore, parents cannot leave debts to their children. Their setup
extends the framework developed in the income ￿uctuation literature analyzed by Schechtman (1976),
Bewley (1986), Clarida (1987), Laitner (1979, 1992), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994) to account for
child investment decisions.
In a simpli￿ed version of Cunha (2004) and Cunha and Heckman (2004), the problem of the parent is
to maximize the utility of the parents using the recursive representation for ￿rst period preferences:
V1 (h,b,ε)=m a x
cy,I1,s
{u(cy)+βE[V2 (h,s,I1,η)|ε]},
78Recent work by Caucutt and Lochner (2004) also considers a stochastic version of this model.
81where cy is the consumption of the parents while their children are young, subject to
cy + I1 +
s
1+r
= whε+ b (24)
where s is saving and
s ≥− whηmin.( 2 5 )
The second period parental utility problem in recursive form is





where co is the consumption of the parents in the second period of their child￿s life cycle, subject to the
constraints
co + I2 +
b0
1+r
= whη + s, (26)
b
0 ≥ 0, (27)
and technology (13).
Restriction (25) is what Aiyagari (1994) calls the natural borrowing limit. It arises as a combination
of the restrictions that parents cannot leave negative debts to their children and that consumption cannot
be negative. Note that the natural borrowing l i m i tv a r i e sw i t hp a r e n t a lh u m a nc a p i t a lh. The higher the
parental human capital, the more parents can borrow to ￿nance consumption and early investments. The






∂E[V2 (h0,b 0,ε 0)|η]
∂b0 =0if b
0 > 0.
82The fact that parents cannot extract resources from descendents has consequences for the pro￿le of
investments in human capital of the child. The inability of the parents to leave debts for their children in
order to ￿nance human capital investments makes both early and late investments a function of parental
lifetime resources. Parents who are very poor tend to invest much less, both early and late, than parents
who are better oﬀ. Consequently, gaps in skill formation arise even in the early ages of child development,
a fact consistent with the evidence presented in part II and in an entire literature (see, e.g., the essays in
Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997).
Figure 19 is reproduced from Cunha and Heckman (2004), who study educational policies in a Laitner
(1992) economy. It is based on their provisional estimates for the technology of skill formation. It shows
the costs of remediation when the government makes up for parental de￿cits in investments due to binding
lifetime credit constraints, so that b =0(that is, the parents receive no bequests from the grandparents).79
The graph plots the short-run costs, by a measure of parental resources, of a policy that attains the
counterfactual human capital stock of the child that would arise if households had access to complete
markets in an Arrow-Debreu sense.80 There are two ways the government can pursue this policy. In
the ￿rst case, the government provides educational goods and services in both early and late investment
periods. In the second case, the government intervenes only during the late investment period (e.g. a
tuition policy).
The lesson from this analysis is that when the government intervenes only in the late period but not the
early period and attempts to achieve a ￿rst best solution at all levels of parental income, remediation costs
are much higher than when the government intervenes in both periods. Furthermore, for parents with very
low income, so that early investments are very low, there is no amount of government-provided educational
g o o d sa n ds e r v i c e st h a tc a na t t a i nt h eo bj e c t i v e so ft h ep o l i c yd u et ot h eh i g hl e v e lo fC E S - c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y
79The estimates of the parameters of (13) reported in Cunha and Heckman (2004) are ρ =0 .7012,γ=0 .8649, and
φ = −0.4108.
80By complete markets in this case we mean that parents can buy insurance against the realizations of temporary shocks
in earnings ε and η.
83and self-productivity.81
In long-run equilibrium, the possibility of substitution among investments at diﬀerent stages of the life
cycle raises challenges for designing an optimal economic policy. If in the ￿rst period agents know that late
investments are subsidized, such subsidies may either encourage or discourage early investments. It will
discourage early investment if I1 and I2 are close substitutes. It will encourage early investment if I1 and
I2 are strong complements. Empirically, the latter appears to be the relevant case. Cunha (2004) shows
that for the parameter values of Cunha and Heckman (2004), a tuition subsidy causes parents to increase
the amount of early investments in human capital of the child. The case for tuition subsidies lies more in
their eﬀect on early childhood investment than in their eﬀect on alleviating credit constraints operating
on the family during the child￿s adolescent years.
Part IV
Summary and Conclusions
This paper reviews the evidence on the life cycle of human skill formation and interprets it using basic
economic models. The new economics of the life cycle recognizes that childhood is a multistage process
where early investments feed into later investments. Skill begets skill; learning begets learning. The early
in￿uential work of Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986) collapsed childhood into a single period and implicitly
assumed that all investments at all ages of the child are perfect substitutes. This misses important features
of the skill development process.
The evidence reported here is broadly consistent with the self-productivity of human capital investment
and the complementarity of investments at diﬀerent ages. Both factors combine to produce the phenom-
81Note, however, that this is not the pure Leontief case.
84enon that skill begets skill. Complementarity implies that early investments need to be followed by later
investments if the early investments are to pay oﬀ.
We formalize the concept of critical and sensitive periods and introduce the concept of the skill multiplier
which captures the combined eﬀects of complementarity and self-productivity on the child development
process. Complementarity and the skill multiplier produce no trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency
at early ages of human development but a substantial trade-oﬀ at later ages. Once skills are crystallized,
complementarity implies that the returns are highest for investment in the most able. At the youngest ages,
it is possible to form ability and create the complementarity that characterizes late adolescent and early
adult human capital investment processes. Thus early interventions targeted toward the disadvantaged
can be highly eﬀective. Later investments are not.
The main ￿ndings of the literature can be summarized succinctly. First, abilities matter. A large num-
ber of empirical studies document that cognitive ability aﬀects both the likelihood of acquiring advanced
training and higher education, and the economic returns to those activities. Both cognitive and noncogni-
tive abilities matter in determining participation in crime, teenage pregnancy, drug use and participation
in other deviant activities. The evidence that abilities matter tells us nothing whatsoever about whether
they are genetically determined.
Second, ability is multidimensional. IQ has to be distinguished from what is measured by achieve-
ment tests, although it partly determines success on achievement tests. Noncognitive skills (perseverance,
motivation, self-control and the like) have direct eﬀects on wages (given schooling), schooling, teenage
pregnancy, smoking, crime and achievement tests. Both cognitive and noncognitive skills aﬀect socioe-
conomic success. Both are strongly in￿uenced by family environments. The old dichotomy between an
invariant, genetically determined ability and acquired skills is a false one that still continues to in￿uence
the literature in economics. Abilities and skills are both acquired. They are in￿uenced both by genes and
the environment.
85Third, ability gaps in both cognitive and noncognitive skills across individuals and across socioeconomic
groups open up at early ages. They are strongly correlated with family background factors, like parental
education and maternal ability, which, when controlled for in a statistical sense, largely eliminate these gaps.
Inputs of schooling quality and resources have relatively small eﬀects on early ability de￿cits. Parenting
practices have strong eﬀects on emotional development and motivation. This correlational evidence is
supported by the experimental evidence from the Perry Preschool Program and the Abecedarian program.
Fourth, the importance of family credit constraints in the child￿s adolescent years in explaining college
attendance (and other) diﬀerentials across socioeconomic groups is greatly exaggerated in the recent litera-
ture. While there is an identi￿able group of families constrained in this fashion, it is not numerically large.
Interventions targeted toward this group can be eﬀective but will not substantially eliminate gaps in college
attendance. The real binding constraint is the inability of children to buy favorable family environments
at early ages.
Fifth, it is possible to partially compensate for adverse family environments. Evidence from random-
ized trials conducted on intervention programs targeted at disadvantaged children who are followed into
adulthood, suggests that it is possible to eliminate some of the gaps due to early disadvantage. Enriched
and sustained interventions at the youngest ages raise IQ. The Abecedarian program provided an enriched
intervention for disadvantaged children starting at age 4 months. The children who received the interven-
tion score consistently higher than the children who do not, even long after the treatment is discontinued.
Later interventions like the Perry Preschool program show no lasting eﬀect on IQ. However, eﬀects on
motivation and, hence, achievement test scores are found. Children are less likely to commit crime and
have out of wedlock births and are more likely to participate in regular schooling. Early interventions
have a substantial eﬀect on adult performance and have a high economic return (See Currie and Blau, this
volume).
Sixth, diﬀerent types of abilities appear to be manipulable at diﬀerent ages. Thus, while factors aﬀecting
86IQ de￿cits need to be addressed at very early ages for interventions to be eﬀective, there is evidence that
later interventions in the adolescent years can aﬀect noncognitive skills as well as the knowledge measured
by achievement tests. Achievement is determined by both cognitive and noncognitive factors. This evidence
is rooted in the neuroscience that establishes the malleability of the prefrontal cortex into the early 20s.
This is the region of the brain that governs emotion and self-regulation.
Seventh, the later the remediation, the less eﬀective it is. Classroom remediation programs designed to
combat early cognitive de￿cits have a poor track record. Public job training programs and adult literacy
and educational programs, like the GED, that attempt to remediate years of educational and emotional
neglect among disadvantaged individuals have a low economic return, and for young males, the return is
negative. This evidence is consistent with strong complementarity of investment over the life cycle of the
child.
Eighth, the economic returns to initial investments at early ages are high. The economic return to
investment at older ages is lower. The technology of skill formation which we analyze in this essay suggests
a strong skill multiplier eﬀect of investment. Investment at an early age produces a high return through
self-productivity and direct complementarity. Early investment in cognitive and noncognitive skills lowers
the cost of later investment by making learning at later ages more eﬃcient. The skill multiplier highlights
the value of early investment. It also demonstrates that there is no trade-oﬀ between equity (targeting
programs at disadvantaged families) and eﬃciency (getting the highest economic returns), provided that
t h ei n v e s t m e n t sa r em a d ea te a r l ya g e s .T h e r ei ss u c hat r a d e - o ﬀ at later ages.
Ninth, CES-complementarity of early with late investments implies that early investments must be
f o l l o w e du pb yl a t e ri n v e s t m e n t si no r d e rt ob ee ﬀective. Nothing in the new economics of human skill
formation suggests that we should starve later educational and skill enhancement eﬀorts. The main ￿nding
from the recent literature is that we should prioritize, and shift our priorities, in a marginal fashion by
redirecting a given total sum of expenditure on skill investment to earlier ages relative to how it is currently
87allocated toward disadvantaged populations that do not provide enriched environments for their children.
88Part V
Appendix
11 The General Technology of Skill Formation
Let St be a L￿1 vector of skills or abilities at stage t. Included are pure cognitive abilities (e.g., IQ) as well
as noncognitive abilities (time preference, self control, patience, judgment). The notation is suﬃciently
￿exible to include acquired skills like general education or a speci￿c skill. Agents start out life with vector
S0 of skills (abilities). The S0 are produced by genes and in utero environments which are known to aﬀect
child outcomes (see the essays in Keating and Hertzman, 1999).
Let It be a K ￿ 1 vector of investments at stage t. These include all inputs invested in the child
including parental and social inputs. The technology of skill formation can be written as
St+1 = ft (St,I t)
where ft is a stage-t function mapping skill (ability) levels and investment at stage t into skill (ability)
levels at t +1 . For simplicity we assume that ft is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in its arguments. Its
domain of de￿nition is the same for all inputs. The inputs may be diﬀe r e n ta td i ﬀerent stages of the life
cycle, so the inputs in It may be diﬀerent from the inputs at period τ diﬀerent from t.







In the general case this is a L ￿ L matrix. More generally, some components of this matrix may be zero
89at all stages while other components may always be positive. In principle, some skills could have negative
eﬀects in some periods. At some stages, some components may be zero while at other stages they may be
positive.





Higher levels of St raise the productivity of It. Alternatively, higher levels of It raise the productivity of St.
Again, in the general case, some components at some or all stages may have zero eﬀects, and some may
have negative eﬀects. They can switch signs across stages.
This notation is suﬃciently general to entertain the possibility that some components of skill are







=0 ,k > 0.
Sensitive periods are those periods where, at the same level of input St,I t, the
∂St+1
∂It are high. More
formally, let St = st,I t = it,tis a sensitive period for skill (or ability) j if
∂St+k+1,j
∂It+k





ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
St=st,It=it
,k 6=0 .
Clearly there may be multiple sensitive periods, and there may be sensitivity with respect to one input
that is not true of other inputs.
90At each stage t, agents can perform (are expected to perform) certain tasks. The level of performance
in task l at stage t is Tl,t = Tl,t(St). For some tasks, and some stages, components of St may be substitutes
or complements. Thus we distinguish complementarity or substitution in skills (abilities) in stage t in task
performance from complementarity or substitution in skill production. Agents de￿cient in some skills may
specialize in some tasks. This is an alternative form of remediation compared to remediation through skill
investment.
12 Relationship with the Ben Porath (1967) Model
The conventional formulation of the technology of skill formation is due to Ben Porath. Let ht be a scalar
human capital. This corresponds to a model with one skill (general human capital) and one task. In his
setup, Tt (St)=ht (St). He makes the additional (implicit) assumption that ht (St)=h(St). His model
postulates that human capital at time t +1depends on human capital at t, invariant ability (denoted θ),
and investment at t, It.I t may be a vector. The same type of investments are made at each stage. Skill is
measured in the same units over time. His speci￿cation of the investment technology is
ht+1 = f (It,h t,θ)
where f is concave in It. The technology is specialized further to allow for depreciation of scalar human
capital at rate σ. Thus we obtain
ht+1 = g(It,h t,θ)+( 1− σ)ht.
When σ =0 , t h e r ei sn od e p r e c i a t i o n .￿ ht￿ is carried over (not fully depreciated) as long as σ<1.




∂ht +(1− σ) > 0. This comes from two sources:






. If g(It,h t,θ)=φ1 (ht,θ)+φ2 (It,θ), there is no essential distinction
between (1 − σ)ht and g(It,h t,θ) as sources of self-productivity if we allow σ to depend on θ (σ(θ)).





In a more general case, some components of this vector may be negative or zero. In the case of universal
complementarity, the stock of ht raises the marginal productivity of It. Direct complementarity and self-
productivity, singly and together, show why skill begets skill. Our model generalizes the Ben Porath
model by (a) allowing for diﬀerent skill formation technologies at diﬀerent stages; (b) allowing qualitatively
diﬀerent investments at diﬀerent stages; (c) allowing for both skill and ability formation and (d) considering
the case of vector skills and abilities.
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Figure 7
Source:  These numbers were computed from the CPS P-20 School Reports and the October CPS.
*Dependent is living at parental home or supported by parental family while at college.
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Figure 8
Source:  These numbers were computed from the CPS P-20 School Reports and the October CPS. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.(1) (2) (3) (4)
College Enrollment College Enrollment College Enrollment College Enrollment
Permanent Family Income at Ages 0-18 (in 10K) 0.0839** 0.0747** 0.0902** 0.0779**
(0.0121) (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0284)
PIAT Math at Age 12 0.0077** 0.0076** 0.0076** 0.0075**
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Permanent Family Income at Ages 0-5 (in 10K) - 0.0158 - 0.0149
- (0.0238) - (0.0261)
Permanent Family Income at Ages 16-18 (in 10K) - - -0.0069 -0.0023
- - (0.0177) (0.0194)
Constant 0.1447** 0.1404** 0.1410** 0.1380**
(0.0264) (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0273)
Observations 863 863 861 861
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Permanent family income is discounted to age 0 using a 5% rate.
Table 1A   Regression of College Enrollment on Various Measures of Family Income and PIAT Math at Age 12(1) (2) (3) (4)
College Enrollment College Enrollment College Enrollment College Enrollment
Permanent Family Income at Ages 0-18 (in 10K) 0.0942** 0.0829** 0.1031** 0.0887**
(0.0108) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0270)
Permanent Family Income at Ages 0-5 (in 10K) - 0.0259 - 0.0233
- (0.0220) - (0.0246)
Permanent Family Income at Ages 16-18 (in 10K) - - -0.0108 -0.0048
- - (0.0170) (0.0188)
Constant 0.1367** 0.1179** 0.1329** 0.1158**
(0.0243) (0.0251) (0.0246) (0.0252)
Observations 1015 987 1013 985
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Permanent family income is discounted to age 0 using a 5% rate.
Table 1B   Regression of College Enrollment on Various Measures of Family Income Table 2
Average Marginal Eect on Participation in Company Training
Average Marginal Eect
Variables White Males Black Males Hispanic Males
( 1 )( 2 )( 1 )( 2 )( 1 ) ( 2 )
Age-Adjusted AFQT 0.0149 - 0.0182 - 0.0066 -
(0=0024) - (0=0033) - (0=0037) -
Family Income in 1979 -0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0019 0.0011 0.0015
(in $10,000) (0=0012) (0=0011) (0=0024) (0=0023) (0=0024) (0=0023)
Grade Completed 0.0382 - 0.0060 - 0.0036 -
(0=001) - (0=0014) - (0=0014) -
Father’s Education -0.0014 0.0007 0.0003 0.0010 0.0002 0.0008
(0=0006) (0=0005) (0=0008) (0=0008) (0=0007) (0=0007)
Variables White Females Black Females Hispanic Females
( 1 )( 2 )( 1 )( 2 )( 1 ) ( 2 )
Age-Adjusted AFQT 0.0076 - 0.0169 - 0.0159 -
(0=0025) - (0=0038) - (0=0045) -
Family Income in 1979 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0065 -0.0043
(in $10,000) (0=0011) (0=0011) (0=0024) (0=0023) (0=0031) (0=0029)
Grade Completed 0.0027 - 0.0014 - 0.0013 -
(0=0010) - (0=0016) - (0=0016) -
Father’s Education 0.0001 0.0009 0.0015 0.0021 -0.00001 0.0007
(0=0006) (0=0006) (0=0008) (0=0008) (0=0009) (0=0008)
Notes: The panel data set was constructed using NLSY79 data from 1979-1994. Data on training in 1987 is
combined with 1988 in the original dataset. Company training consists of formal training run by employer,
and military training excluding basic training. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Speciﬁcation (1) includes a constant, age, father’s education, mother’s education, number of siblings,
southern residence at age 14 dummy, urban residence at age 14 dummy, and year dummies.
Speciﬁcation (2) drops age-adjusted AFQT and grade completed. Average marginal eect is
estimated using average derivatives from a probit regression.Table 3
Return to one year of college for individuals
at dierent percentiles of the math test score distribution
White males from High School and Beyond
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Average return in the population 0.1121 0.1374 0.1606 0.1831 0.2101
(0.0400) (0.0328) (0.0357) (0.0458) (0.0622)
Return for those who attend college 0.1640 0.1893 0.2125 0.2350 0.2621
(0.0503) (0.0582) (0.0676) (0.0801) (0.0962)
Return for those who do not attend college 0.0702 0.0954 0.1187 0.1411 0.1682
(0.0536) (0.0385) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0425)
Return for those at the margin 0.1203 0.1456 0.1689 0.1913 0.2184
(0.0364) (0.0300) (0.0345) (0.0453) (0.0631)
Wages are measured in 1991 by dividing annual earnings by hours worked per week
multiplied by 52. The math test score is an average of two 10th grade math test scores.
There are no dropouts in the sample and the schooling variable is binary (high school - college).
The gross returns to college are divided by 3.5 (average dierence in years of schooling
between high school graduates that go to college and high school graduates that do not in a
sample of white males in the NLSY). To construct the numbers in the table we proceed in two
steps. First we compute the marginal treatment eect using the method of local instrumental
variables as in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001). The parameters in the table are
dierent weighted averages of the marginal treatment eect. Therefore, in the second step
we compute the appropriate weight for each parameter and use it to construct a weighted
average of the marginal treatment eect (see also Carneiro, 2002). Individuals at the margin
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AFQT Decile
      Note: Uses the AFQT calculation procedure as defined by the Department of Defense in 1989. Data used 1979î2000
Data from NLSY
Figure 12A
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AFQT Decile
      Note: Uses the AFQT calculation procedure as defined by the Department of Defense in 1989. Data used 1979î2000
Data from NLSY
Figure 12B





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Ta b l e   5
E¤ects of Early Intervention Programs
Program/Study Costs¤ Program Description Test Scores Schooling Pre-Delinquency
Crime
Abecedarian full-time year round classes high scores at 34% less grade retention by
Project¤¤ for children from infancy ages 1-4 2nd grade; better reading and
(Ramey, et. al, 1988) through preschool math pro…ciency
part-time classes for
Early Training¤¤ children in summer; weekly higher scores at 16% less grade retention;
(Gray et al., 1982) home visits during school ages 5-10 21% higher HS grad.rates
year
Harlem Study individual teacher-child higher scores at 21% less grade retention
(Palmer, 1983) sessions twice-weekly for ages 3-5
young males
home visits for parents for rated less aggressive
Houston PCDC¤¤ 2 yrs; child nursery care 4 higher scores at and hostile by mothers
(Johnson, 1988) days/wk in year 2 age 3 (ages 8-11)
(Mexican Americans)
full-time year-round classes
Milwaukee Project¤¤ for children through 1st higher scores at






N/AProgram/Study Costs¤ Program Description Test Scores Schooling Pre-Delinquency
Crime
Mother-Child Home
Program home visits with mothers higher scores at 6% less grade retention
(Levenstein, O’Hara, and children twice weekly ages 3-4
& Madden, 1983)
Perry Preschool
Program¤¤ weekly home visits with 2.3 vs. 4.6 lifetime
(Schweinhart, $13,400 parents; intensive, high higher scores in 21% less grade retention or arrests by age 27
Barnes, & Weikart, quality preschool services all studied years special services; 21% 7% vs. 35% arrested
1993) for 1-2 years (ages 5-27) higher HS grad. rates 5 or more times
Rome Head Start $5,400 part-time classes for 12% less grade retention;
(Monroe & (2 yrs) children; parent 17% higher HS grad. rates
McDonald, 1981) involvement
Syracuse University 6% vs. 22% had
Family Development $38,100 weekly home visits for higher scores at probation …les;
(Lally et al., 1988) family; day care year round ages 3-4 o¤enses were less
severe
better-school attendance & rated less aggressive
family support; home visits better language adjustment; fewer special & pre-delinquent by
Yale Experiment $23,300 and day care as needed for development at adjustment; school services teachers and parents
30 months 30 months (age 12 1/2) (ages 12 1/2)
Notes: All comparisons are for program participants vs. non-participants. * Costs valued in 1990 dollars. ** Studies used a random assignment
experimental design to determine program impacts. Data from Donohue and Siegelman (1998), Schweinhart, Barnes, and Weikart (1993),
and Seitz (1990) for the impacts reported here. Source: Heckman, Lochner, Smith, and Taber (1997).
N/A
Table 5 (continued) Table 6 
Outcomes of Early Intervention Programs
Followed Up Age When Treatment Eect Control Change in
Program (Years of Operation) Outcome to Age Last Statistically Signiﬁcant Group Treated Group
Cognitive Measures
Early Training Project (1962 - 1965) IQ 16-20 6 82.8 +12.2
Perry Preschool Project (1962 - 1967) IQ 27 7 87.1 +4.0
Houston PCDC (1970 - 1980) IQ 8-11 2 90.8 +8.0
Syracuse FDRP (1969 - 1970) IQ 15 3 90.6 +19.7
Carolina Abecedarian (1972 - 1985) IQ 21 12 88.4 +5.3
Project CARE (1978 - 1984) IQ 4.5 3 92.6 +11.6
IHDP (1985 - 1988 ) IQ (HLBW sample) 8 8 92.1 +4.4
Educational Outcomes
Early Training Project Special Education 16-20 18 29% -26%
Perry Preschool Project Special Education 27 19 28% -12%
High School Graduation 27 45% +21%
Chicago CPC (1967 - present) Special Education 20 18 25% -10%
Grade Retention 15 38% -15%
High School Graduation 20 39% +11%
Carolina Abecedarian College Enrollment 21 21 14% +22%
Economic Outcomes
Perry Preschool Project Arrest Rate 27 27 69% -12%
Employment Rate 27 32% +18%
Monthly Earnings 27 $766 + $453
Welfare Use 27 32% -17%
Chicago CPC (preschool vs. no preschool) Juvenile Arrests 20 18 25% -8%
Syracuse FDRP Probation Referral 15 15 22% -16%
Elmira PEIP (1978 - 1982) Arrests (HR sample) 15 15 0.53 -.029
Notes: HLBW = heavier, low birth weight sample; HR = high risk. Cognitive measures include Stanford-Binet and Weshler Intelligence Scales, California
Achievement Tests, and other IQ and achievement tests measuring cognitive ability. All results signiﬁcant at .05 level or higher. Source: Karoly, 2001.
For a discussion of the speciﬁc treatments oered under each program see Heckman (2000) and Karoly (2001).Within-UK Adoptees
Age of Adoption (Months): 6 Before 6 At 6-24 At 24-42
Weight at Adoption - -2.1 -2.3 -
- (1.7) (1.7) -
Height at Adoption - -1.8 -2.2 -
- (1.6) (2.4) -
- 76.5 48.1 -
- (48.1) (25.4) -
Weight at Age 4 0.45 -0.02 0.04 -
(0.79) (0.92) (0.94) -
Height at Age 4 0.25 -0.29 -0.36 -
(0.91) (0.89) (1.02) -
Denver Developmental Scale at Age 4 117.7 115.7 96.7 -
(24.3) (23.4) (21.3) -
McCarthy GCI at Age 4 109.4 105.9 91.7 -
(14.8) (17.9) (18.0) -
Weight at Age 6 0.30 0.02 -0.25 -0.85
(0.90) (0.97) (0.96) (0.98)
20 5 1 8
(1) (0) (2) (7)
McCarthy GCI at Age 6 117 114 99 90
(17.8) (18.3) (19.2) (23.8)
Romanian Orphans
Table 7. Anthropomorphic, Developmental, and Cognitive Outcomes Of Romanian and Within-UK Adoptees Over Time
Standard deviations are reported below in parentheses. All anthropometric measurements are standardized using the UK age-specific distributions. The Denver Developmental Scale is are based
on specific behaviors (e.g., standing while holding on to something, lifting the head, making meaningful "da-da" sounds). Due to ceiling effects, the Denver scale is not meaningful at age 6, so
O’Connor et al. (2000) use the percentage with impairment (defined as a score below 70) as the test criterion. The GCI is the total score on the McCarthy Scales of Children’s Abilities. It
summarizes verbal, quantitative, perceptual, and memory performance. See Rutter et al. (1998) and O’Connor et al. (2000) for more details on the analysis.
Percentage With Denver Developmental Scale at Age 6 Below 70
Denver Developmental Scale At AdoptionTable 8
Estimated Beneﬁts of Mentoring Programs (Treatment Group Reductions Compared to Control Group)
Program Outcome Measure Change Program Costs per Participant
Big Brother / Big Sister $500 - $1500*
Initiating drug use -45.8%
Initiation alcohol use -27.4%
# of times hit someone -31.7%
# of times stole something -19.2%
Grade Point Average 3.0%
Skipped Class -36.7%
Skipped Day of School -52.2%
Trust in Parent 2.7%
Lying to Parent -36.6%
Peer Emotional Support 2.3%
Sponsor - A - Scholar $1485
10th Grade GPA (100 point scale) 2.9
11th Grade GPA (100 point scale) 2.5
% Attending College (1 year after HS) 32.8%
% Attending College (2 years after HS) 28.1%
Quantum Opportunity Program
Graduated HS or GED +26%
Enrolled in 4-year college +15%
Enrolled in 2-year college +24%
Currently employed full time +13%
Self receiving welfare -22%
% ever arrested -4%
Sources: Beneﬁts from Heckman (1999) and Taggart (1995), costs from Johnson (1996) and Herrera et al. (2000).
Notes: *Costs, in 1996 dollars, for school-based programs are as low as $500 and more expensive
community based mentoring programs cost as high as $1500; HS = high schoolTable 9
E¤ects of Selected Adolescent Social Programs on Schooling, Earnings, and Crime
Program/Study Costs¤ Program Description Schooling Earnings¤ Crime¤
disc. pres.
7 mo. of educ. value of Estimated
Job Corps and vocational training for no e¤ect increased Reduction in crime
(Long et al., 1981) $11,000 16-21 yr. olds earnings of valued at approx.
(mostly male) $10,000
2 summers of short-run gains
employment, academic in test scores; no
STEP remediation & life e¤ect on school
(Walker and skills for 14 & 15 completion rates
Viella-Velez, 1992) year olds
4% vs. 16%
Quantum Opportunities counseling; educ., comm., 34% higher HS convicted; .28 vs.
Program¤¤ $10,600 & devp. services; grad./GED rates .56 avg. number of

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The indifference curves of the marginal productivity of the
ratio of late to early investments as a function of φ and γ
Deﬁne ω = I2
I1, the ratio of late to early investments in human capital. From the homogeneity of degree one
we can rewrite the technology as:
h = I1
£
γ +( 1− γ)ωφ¤ 1
φ .





γ +( 1− γ)ωφ¤ 1−φ
φ ωφ−1
This ﬁgure displays the indiﬀerence curves of ∂h
∂ω when ω =0 .5. Each indiﬀerence curve shows the corresponding
level of ∂h
∂ω. Note that for a given value of γ the value of the function tends to decrease as we increase α. The























The indifference curves of the marginal productivity of the
ratio of late to early investments as a function of φ and γ
when I2/I1= 1/2.










Deﬁne ω = I2
I1, the ratio of late to early investments in human capital. From the homogeneity of degree one we
can rewrite the technology as:
h = I1
£
γ +( 1− γ)ωφ¤ 1
φ .





γ +( 1− γ)ωφ¤ 1−φ
φ ωφ−1
This ﬁgure displays the indiﬀerence curves of ∂h
∂ω when ω =0 .5. Each indiﬀerence curve shows the corresponding
level of ∂h
∂ω. Note that for a given value of γ the value of the function tends to decrease as we increase α. However,











The Ratio of Early to Late Investment in Human Capital
As a function of the Skill Multiplier for Different Values of Complementarity
Leontief
φ = - 0.5
CobbDouglas
φ =  0.5
Skill Multiplier (γ)
This ﬁgure shows the optimal ratio of early to late investments, I1
I2, as a function of the skill multiplier
parameter γ, for diﬀerent values of the complementarity parameter φ, assuming that the interest rate r is zero.
The optimal ratio I1
I2 is the solution of the parental problem of maximizing the present value of the child’s wealth
through investments in human capital, h, and transfers of risk-free bonds, b. I no r d e rt od ot h a t ,p a r e n t sh a v et o
decide how to allocate a total of M dollars into early and late investments in human capital, I1 and I2, respectively,
and risk-free bonds. Let q d e n o t et h ep r e s e n tv a l u ea so fp e r i o d“ 3 ”o ft h ef u t u r ep r i c e so fo n ee ﬃciency unit of





































ratio is plotted in this ﬁgure when φ →− ∞(Leontief), φ = −0.5,φ=0(Cobb-Douglas) and φ =0 .5 and for
values of the skill multiplier γ between 0.1 and 0.9.  The Ratio of Optimal Early and Late Investments 
 Under Dierent Assumptions About the Skill Formation Technology
Low Self-Productivity: 





High Degree of Complementarity:  
  	 as    
  	 as   
Low Degree of Complementarity:     	 
   as   	 
 as   	
 This table summarizes the behavior of the ratio of optimal early to late investments according to four cases: 	 and 	 have
high complementarity, but self-productivity is low; 	 and 	 have both high complementarity and self-productivity; 	 and 	 have
low complementarity and self-productivity; and 	 and 	 have low complementarity, but high self-productivity. When 	 and 	
exhibit high complementary, complementarity dominates and is a force towards equal distribution of investments between early
and late periods. Consequently, self-productivity plays a limited role in determining the ratio 
 (row 1). On the other hand, when
	and 	 exhibit a low degree of complementarity, self-productivity tends to concentrate investments in the  period if
self-productivity is low, but in the 	 period if it is high (row 2).Generation Born
At Period  t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
-3 Old Adult
-2 Young Adult Old Adult
-1 Adolescent Young Adult Old Adult
0 Child Adolescent Young Adult Old Adult
1 Child Adolescent Young Adult Old Adult
2 Child Adolescent Young Adult
3 Child Adolescent
4 Child
Periods
The Generational Structure
Table 11 
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a
t
i
c
s
h
o
c
k
s
.
T
h
e
r
e
a
r
e
t
w
o
w
a
y
s
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
-
m
e
n
t
c
a
n
p
u
r
s
u
e
t
h
i
s
p
o
l
i
c
y
.
I
n
t
h
e

r
s
t
c
a
s
e
,
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
g
o
o
d
s
a
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
i
n
b
o
t
h
e
a
r
l
y
a
n
d
l
a
t
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
.
I
n
t
h
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
c
a
s
e
,
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
s
o
n
l
y
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
l
a
t
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
T
h
e
m
e
s
s
a
g
e
i
s
c
l
e
a
r
:
w
h
e
n
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
e
s
o
n
l
y
i
n
t
h
e
l
a
t
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
r
e
m
e
d
i
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
s
t
s
a
r
e
m
u
c
h
h
i
g
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
w
h
e
n
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
c
t
s
i
n
b
o
t
h
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
f
o
r
a
l
l
l
e
v
e
l
s
o
f
p
a
r
e
n
t
a
l
i
n
c
o
m
e
.
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
m
o
r
e
,
f
o
r
p
a
r
e
n
t
s
w
i
t
h
v
e
r
y
l
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
,
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
n
o
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
-
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
g
o
o
d
s
a
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
t
h
a
t
c
a
n
a
t
t
a
i
n
t
h
e
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
o
f
t
h
e
p
o
l
i
c
y
.
I
n
t
h
i
s

g
u
r
e
,
i
t
i
s
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
i
s
u
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
w
h
e
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
t
o
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
S
e
e
C
u
n
h
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
f
o
r
l
o
n
g
-
r
u
n
e

e
c
t
s
o
f
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
r
e
m
e
d
i
a
t
i
o
n
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
.